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ARTICLES
JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN
METHODOLOGY
Jeanne L. Schroeder*
Hear and attend and listen; for this befell and behappened
and became and was...

INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the last century, Rudyard Kipling spun fantastic
yams that supposedly explained how certain surprising facts about
the world came about. The Just So Stories^ drew from sources as
diverse as Eastern mythology and Western paleontology to speculate
on the causes of not only natural curiosities, such as how the camel
got his hump, but also cultural ones, such as how the alphabet was
made.
At the turn of this century. Judge Richard Posner, the doyen of
the law-and-economics movement, draws from sources as diverse as
economics and socio-biology to spin fantastic yams that supposedly
explain not only legal curiosities, such as how the tort system came
about, but also social ones, such as why mothers love their children.
Kipling implicitly understood that although "abduction"^—the
post hoc imagining of explanatory stories—can play an essential role
in scientific inquiry, it is merely a means of forming, not proving,
hypotheses. One can easily abduct explanations that, while sounding
plausible within their context, appear fantastic when examined more
fully. Consequently, Kipling created his just so stories as fairy tales

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES 177 (Everyman's Library Children's Qassics

1992) (1902).
2 According to the editor's notes to the Everyman's Library Children's Classics edition,
the title of the collection reflects that Kipling's children, with their infantile love of repetition
and precision, always insisted that the stories be repeated word for word—"just so." Of
course, the title also suggests that the author was jokingly asserting that the stories were true,
and things did, in fact, occur "just so." See id. at Editor's Comments.
3 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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for the amusement of his daughter." In contrast, Posner claims his
just so stories are scientific theories for the edification of the legal
community. He wants his audience to accept his economic analysis
not merely as an account of past legal developments, but as a model
for future ones.®
Posner's most recent foray into methodological issues appears
in a vociferous reply to the rather modest suggestion by Professors
Christine JoUs, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler ("JST") that legal
scholars might wish to consider the imphcations of certain recent
empirical economic research on decision making.® Posner accuses
JST of a failure to grasp not only the economic theory of rational
choice, but also the very nature of scientific theory per se.^ And yet,
Posner's reply evinces both a highly idiosyncratic definition of
rationality and an ad hoc argument that strays far afield from the
methodology that usually underlies economics' claim to scientific
status.
This Article is one part of a three-part critique of Posner's
conception of economic rationality. In Rationality in Law and
Economics Scholarship,^ I explore at length the degeneration of
Posner's conception of rationality from the elegant, if simplistic,
model drawn from neoclassical economics to its current ad hoc state.
Indeed, all that seems to be left of the "rational" component of
4 Kipling wrote the just so stories for Josephine, his favorite child The narrator addresses
each story to her as his "Best Beloved," and she is no doubt the model for the "little girldaughter" heroine of several of the stories. Sadly, she died at the age of six before the stories
appeared in print in 1902. This might account for the palpable sense of melancholy that
haunts the author's enigmatic illustrations to what are supposed to be humorous stories.
5 As Posner himself notes, wealth maximization has both positive and normative aspects.
The former posits "that the common law is best understood on the 'as if assumption that
judges try to maximize the wealth of society." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
172-73 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW]. The latter posits that "judges
should interpret... antitrust statutes to make them conform to the dictates of wealth
maximization." Id. at 173; see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
Even Posner now admits that "[n]ot all questions that come up in law, however, can be
effortlessly recast as economic questions." POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra, at 22
(discussing abortion specifically); see Kornhauser, supra, at 682 ("In recent years, Posner has
weakened his claim from one that asserted that common law courts should be exclusively
concerned with wealth maximization to one that asserts that wealth maximization is one of the
values that common law courts ought to pursue.").
6 See Christine lolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1551 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al.. Behavioral
Approach]. For consistency, I shall follow Posner's awkward lead and refer to Professors
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler as though they were a single triple-bodied Geryon. See Richard A.
Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551
(1998) [hereinafter Posner, Behavioral Economics].
7 See infra Part II. A.
8 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 ORE. L. REV.
147 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, Economic Rationality].
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Posnerian rationality is the affirmative normative connotations of
the term itself. In Fear of Freedom: A Polemic Against Policy f I
contrast the concept of rationahty as used in neoclassical economics
with that used in the speculative philosophic tradition. Economic
rationality is consequentialist reasoning: choosing an appropriate
means to achieve a pre-given end. In contrast, speculative rationality
is the process by which a subject determines an appropriate end.
Economists assume that rational behavior is predictable and that
irrationality is the source of unpredictability. The speculative
philosopher believes that irrationality can be rigidly predictable
whereas rationality, which is grounded in freedom, is the source of
true spontaneity.
In this Article, I examine the methodology that Posner claims to
follow and the methodology that he actually follows in developing
his account of rationality. Posner presents his methodology as being
standard within economics. He states that, in science and economics
(and, presumably, law), theories must be instrumental in nature, and
that the only appropriate purpose of an economic theory is
prediction. I show that not all economists—let alone scientists,
philosophers, or legal theorists—agree with the assessment that
science should be primarily useful, like engineering, and adopt a
number of alternative goals, such as description, explanation, and
understanding.
I believe that Posner concentrates on the goal of prediction
because he sees law and economics as a form of policy science. That
is, he wishes to use the law to manipulate legal and economic
subjects to act in such a way in order to further a societal goal, such
as wealth maximization. In contrast, speculative theory and critical
legal theory seek not so much to predict behavior, but to understand
the law. liie critical theorist does not identify with the legislator or
judge who writes and interprets the law, but with the attorney who
advises and represents the individual citizen who is subjected to the
law. The critical theorist seeks to understand how she and others fit
within the legal system, in order to free herself from its manipulation
and, if possible, manipulate the law for her own individual,
subjective purposes. I develop this point extensively elsewhere^" and
shall touch on it only briefly in this Article.
Posner identifies his methodology with the widely adopted
scientific methodology of falsification.
Once again, not all
9 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Fear of Freedom: A Polemic Against Policy (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, Fear of Freedom].
10 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice
and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Four Discourses\,
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Flysterical Attorney, 13 INT'LJ.L. & SEMIOTICS 181 (2000).
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philosophers, scientists, or economists (let alone legal theorists)
agree that falsification is the only appropriate methodology, or even
that it is appropriate at all. Nevertheless, it is certainly a widely
accepted one." Posner does not, however, address directly the
extensive hterature on scientific methodology, but bases his brief
methodological discussions on Milton Friedman's notoriously
controversial essay. The Methodology of Positive Economics^ In
this Article, I briefly describe Friedman's thesis and discuss the
avalanche of criticism it has received. I show that Posner
concentrates precisely on the most idiosyncratic and controversial
portion of Friedman's work—what Friedman's critics call the F-twist,
or the unreaUty principle. Indeed, Posner gives the F-twist an
additional turn of the screw, taking it to a logical extreme that
perhaps should be christened the F-twist. Because Posner claims to
follow falsification, I give a brief discussion of the standard account
of falsification, which was developed by the philosopher of science
Karl Popper, and show how Posner confuses falsification with the
unreliable methodology of verification. Consequently, although
Posner accuses JST of proposing ad hoc nonfalsifiable hypotheses,'^
JST is correct in counteraccusing Posner of precisely the same sin.'"
I, nevertheless, conclude by suggesting that in his recent work
Posner might have stumbled onto the first step in the "sophisticated
falsification" methodology explicated by philosopher of science Imre
Lakatos and promoted by economic historian Mark Blaug. Posner is
correct that a sophisticated falsifier does not abandon the "hard
core" of his working hypothesis merely because he observes data
that at first blush seem to be inconsistent with it—such as the
observations of behavioral economists that seem inconsistent with
the rationality postulate of neoclassical price theory. Rather, the
sophisticated falsifier first uses "abduction" to attempt to formulate
a protective belt of auxihary hypotheses—or post hoc
explanations—that might account for the anomaly and thereby
11 The preeminence of falsification methodology is probably less widely accepted by
scientists and philosophers of science than lawyers seem to assume.
See infra text
accompanying notes 129-50. In my theoretical work I rely heavily on the theories of G.W.F.
Hegel and Jacques Lacan. Although Popper's critiques of Hegelianism and psychoanalysis
are notoriously controversial, I believe that he is correct when he says that Hegelian and
Lacanian theory are probably not scientific in the sense of being falsifiable. They are not
based on inductive reasoning from empirical evidence but on the retroactive deductive
method known as the dialectic.
12 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE

ECONOMICS 3 (1984).

13 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1560.
I'l See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to
Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1659-60 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al.. Theories
and Tropes] (referring specifically to Posner's use of evolutionary biology).
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buffer the hard core from attack. This is exactly what Posner does;
he does not, however, follow through with the implications of this
methodology.
Mere abduction of auxiliary hypotheses is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, methodology. The scientist must
further test his auxiliary hypotheses.
I.

FRIEDMAN'S CONTROVERSIAL ESSAY ON METHODOLOGY
This, O Best Beloved, is another story of the high and FarOff TimesP

A.

Controversy

Posner's methodology is based largely on Milton Friedman's
famous, or infamous, essay The Methodology of Positive
Economics^ Many practitioners of "law and economics" have
accepted Posner's claim that this is the methodology generally
accepted by economists." While Friedman's essay has been highly
15 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 93.
16 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12.

While Posner does not always credit Friedman, his
descriptions of "economic" methodology closely track the methodology described in
Friedman's essay. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18-19 (5th
ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
17 A quick Lexis search reveals hterally scores of articles that cite Friedman's essay as
though it represented standard economic theory. For articles that refer specifically to
predictive power as being the only test of a theory, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,871 (1997) (book review); Paul L. Colby & Robert H.
Klonoff, Sponsorship Strategy.- A Reply to Floyd Abrams and Professor Saks, 1993 MD. L.
REV. 458, 473 (1993); Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 89 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2116 (1996); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks
to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 546, 559 (1994); Jeffery L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and
Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 406
(1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851,861 (1992); Daniel Ostas, Postmodern Economic
Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Vision of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193,
221 n.l75 (1998). Surprisingly, Langevoort cites Blaug's discussion of Friedman's essay
without noting that Blaug is not only very critical of Friedman, but that he presents Friedman
as only one of many contemporary methodological schools within economics.
See
Langevoort, supra, at 861 n.32.
Occasionally one does find authors who are aware of the methodological controversy
within economics. See, e.g., Robert B. Seidman, Ann Seidman & Neva Makgetla, Big Bangs
and Decision Making: What Went Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'LL.J. 435,444 n.61 (1995) (noting that
Friedman's "proposition has undergone withering criticism"); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary
Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 910 n.8 (1996).
Tushnet states:
[0]n the rare occasions that practitioners of law and economics attempt to offer
more than the most superficial reasons why economics has something to say to
law, they tend to rely almost entirely on Milton Friedman's famous essay on the
methodology of positive economics, without acknowledging that Friedman's
account of economic methodology is highly contested among philosophers of
economics.

356

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:351

influential, it is not, as Posner implies, generally accepted among
economists. It lies, for example, at the heart of differences not only
within neoclassical economics, such as that between Friedman and
Paul Samuelson, but also those between the Chicago school of
neoclassical economics associated with Friedman and the Carnegie
school of behavioral economics founded by Herbert Simon.^^
In this Part, I show that on the one hand, certain parts of
Friedman's essay can be interpreted to be consistent with standard
accounts of falsification, albeit formulated in a highly idiosjmcratic
and potentially misleading way. On the other hand, Friedman's odd
wording is also consistent with a radical nominalism that threatens to
divorce theory from truth entirely. It is this latter interpretation that
has been dubbed the F-twist, or the unreality principle,^' by
Friedman's detractors.^" Even Blaug, who struggles mightily to
reconcile Friedman's views with more mainstream accounts of
scientific methodology, concludes that "one cannot help being struck
by the lack of methodological sophistication... displayed" by
Friedman and the debate he spawned.^^ Posner concentrates on
probably the most controversial part of Friedman's essay—his
peculiar insistence on the unrealistic nature of the assumptions
underlying scientific theory.^^
1. Instrumentalism
Friedman's methodology is supposed to combine falsification
and instrumentalism.^^ Instrumentalism is the position that a theory
Id.

18 See MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS, OR HOW ECONOMISTS
EXPLAIN (2d ed. 1992) for an excellent introduction to the controversy about economic
methodology generally, including about Friedman's article specifically.
19 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
20 Blaug suggests that, in context, it is not absolutely clear whether Friedman intended
these consequences suggested by Friedman's idiosyncratic language. See infra notes 106-13
and accompanying text.
21 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 104.
22 Posner does admit in at least one place that, although the assumptions underlying a
theory must necessarily be imrealistic, it might also be possible for assumptions to be
insufficiently realistic. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
23 Herbert Hovenkamp suggests, however, that instrumentalism may be, in fact,
antithetical to strict falsification. According to Hovenkamp, the instrumentalist believes:
Once someone has formulated a theory, it is not especially important to attempt
to falsify it aggressively. Rather, one should simply consider how reliably the
theory produces correct answers to a particular question that the researcher
wishes to ask. For example, Newtonian physics is perfectly good for the
engineer building bridges or the field commander shooting artillery, even though
the theory has been falsified by experiments with relativity and might not be the
best theory for someone planning an expedition to Mars.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 832 (1990). I
basically agree with Hovenkamp's statement but, as I discuss below, I believe that his
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is purely a tool for a specific purpose. In Friedman and Posner's
case, theory is primarily a tool for prediction.'" It is frequently
contrasted with "descriptivism"—the view that a scientific theory
should accurately describe reality.'' InstrumentaUsm should also be
contrasted with the use of theory to explain or understand a
phenomenon.
Because the standard of vahdity under
instrumentalism is whether or not a theory serves its purpose,
instrumentalism is agnostic with respect to the truth value of its own
propositions.
Instrumentalism is consistent with, but does not require, a
radical nominalism.
Opinions among scientists as to the
epistemological status of science vary widely. To mention two
extreme positions, Stephen Hawking is a self-proclaimed positivist
who believes that physical theories are just mathematical models we
construct, and that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to
reality, just whether they predict observations.'"^ In contrast, Roger
Penrose, Hawking's frequent collaborator, is a self-described
Neoplatonist who believes that mathematical theory is the true
reality, which the object world only unperfectly reflects. As David
Luban has argued before me, Posner seems to be internally
inconsistent with respect to the truth claims of theory.'« On the one
hand, as I shall explore in this Article, in his argument that
prediction is the only criterion of a theory's validity, Posner
frequently suggests that the hteral truth of a theory is either
unknowable, irrelevant, or nonexistent. On the other hand, a
complete dismissal of truth claims is hard to reconcile with the basic
tenants of falsification, which by positing that hypotheses can be

description of how engineers treat scientific theory is not qnite correct.

See infra text

accompanying notes 129-54.
...... i
u
24 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 91. Posner does, from time to time, admit that the law has
other purposes. For example, in Economic Analysis of Law, he mentions explanation and
intervention in the world as plausible purposes. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra
note 16, at 18-19. In context, however, it seems that Posner's conceptions of explanation and
intervention are closely related, if not totally subsumed, into the broader concept of
prediction. By explanation he seems to mean: if x occurs then y (i.e., we can predict y from x).
Intervention seems to mean the recommendation that someone do x because if she does, then
y will occur.
25 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 98-99; see also Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note
6, at 1560 (distinguishing "between a description and a theory").
26 Stephen Hawking, The Objections of an Unashamed Reductionist, m THE LARGE, THE
SMALL AND THE HUMAN MIND 169 (Malcolm Longair ed., 1997).
27 See ROGER PENROSE, SHADOWS OF THE MIND: A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING
SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 50-51 (1994); Roger Penrose, Space-time in Cosmology, in THE
LARGE, THE SMALL AND THE HUMAN MIND IWPRA note 26, at 1-4.
28 See David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by
Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001,1011-12 (1996).
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proven to be false implies by negative pregnant that some form of
truth is out there, even if we can only indirectly know it.
Karl Popper, probably the foremost proponent of falsification
as scientific methodology, tries to sail a middle passage between
nominalism and realism.^' Working within a tradition that reaches at
least as far back as Kant, Popper argues that humans can never have
direct knowledge of the object world (which he calls world 1),^°
because experience is always mediated through thoughts and
images.^^ Nevertheless, humans are not limited to their own
subjective interpretations (world 2).^^
We can come to an
intersubjective consensus (world 3) about the object world through
the application of an agreed upon methodology." Moreover, Popper
29 As I have elsewhere laboriously stretched a classical allusion with respect to Popper,
"To navigate between the Scylla of individualistic solipsism and the Charybdis of false
universals, objectivity is defined as the Odysseus of intersubjective agreement." Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,17 (1992) [hereinafter Schroeder, SubjectObject].
30 The first world is "the world of physical objects or of physical states." KARL R.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE; AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 106 (1972) [hereinafter

POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE].
31 The second world is "the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or
perhaps behavioural dispositions to act." Id. at 106. Popper emphasizes the importance of the
second world: "The first world and the third world cannot interact save through the
intervention of the second world, the world of subjective or personal experiences." Id. at 155.
32 See id. at 107. Popper states:
Most opponents of the thesis of an objective third world will... usually say that
all these entities [i.e., problems, conjectures, theories, arguments, journals, and
books] are, essentially, symbolic or linguistic expressions of subjective mental
states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act;... that is to say, symbolic
or linguistic means to evoke in others similar mental states or behavioural
dispositions to act.
Against this, I have often argued that one cannot relegate all these entities
and their content to the second world.
Id. Popper believes, rather, in an "independent existence of the third world" Id. He
continues: "It seems to me most important to describe and explain the relationship of the
three worlds in this way—that is, with the second world as the mediator between the first and
third.... [T]he mind may be linked with objects of both the first world and the third world."
Id. at 156.
33 Popper follows Kant:
[T]he word "objective" [is used] to indicate that scientific knowledge should be
justifiable, independently of anybody's whim: a justification is "objective" if in
principle it can be tested and understood by anybody. "If something is 'valid',
[Kant] writes, "for anybody in possession of his reason, then its grounds are
objective and sufficient."
Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable,
but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity
of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested."
KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIHC DISCOVERY 44 (1968) [hereinafter POPPER,
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY] (citation omitted); see also POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 30, at 106-08,152-75; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist
Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109,161-64 (1991) [hereinafter
Schroeder, Abduction]-, Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 17-29. Although Popper
ranted against Hegel in his book. The Open Society and Its Enemies, his theory of the three
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claims that the methodology of falsification eliminates hypotheses
that are inconsistent with world 1 (the object world). As a result,
world 3 (our intersubjective consensus) will over time move further
from world 2 (our subjective opinions) and closer to world 1 (the
object world).^'* Consequently, Jiirgen Habermas has characterized
the philosophy of science since Charles Sanders Peirce as being
concerned with "a method of arriving at uncompelled and
permanent consensus,"^' as opposed to knowledge of existence per
se. That is, in Popperian science "methodology replaces ontology
and epistemology."^® I shall return to Popper in the last section of
this Article, although a complete discussion of the metaphysical
implications of economic theory is necessarily beyond the scope of
this Article.
Both Posner and Friedman claim to adopt a definition of
rationality as instrumental, or ends-means, reasoning.^' Such a
definition of rationahty is neither logically required by an
instrumentalist methodology, nor is it inconsistent with a
descriptivist one. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not surprising that the
concept of rationality as instrumental thinking would appeal to the
same type of people who are drawn to an instrumentalist
methodology. Indeed, I suspect that by implicitly conflating the term
of art "economic rationality" with the colloquial connotations of
worlds resembles a simplistic version of Hegelian idealism. Notoriously, Popper seems never
to have read Hegel but relied on a book of excerpts and inaccurate second-hand descriptions
by critics of Hegel. See K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1966).
34 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 162-64. Popper believes that the third
world, although by necessity a human creation, is nevertheless objective and autonomous of
human consciousness:
The world of language, of conjectures, theories, and arguments—in brief,
the universe of objective knowledge—is one of the most important of these mancreated yet at the same time largely autonomous, universes.
The autonomy of the third world, and the feed-back of the third world upon
the second and even the first, are among the most important facts of the growth
of knowledge.
With the evolution of the argumentative function of language, criticism
becomes the main instrument of further growth.
Our work is fallible, like all human work. We constantly make mistakes,
and there are objective standards of which we may fall short—standards of truth,
of content, of validity, and other standards.
. . . Scientists try to eliminate their false theories, they try to let them die in
their stead.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 118,119,121,122.
35 JfjRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 91 (Jeremy J. Shapiro
trans., 1969).
36 Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 18.
37 I discuss this extensively in Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
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rationality as "sane" or "reasonable"—i.e., rationality is posited not
merely as a name for how people hypothetically do act, but as a
prescription for or definition of how sane people should act'®—the
proponents might be led to assume that instrumentahsm is the only
"reasonable" method. That is, if sane people act instrumentally,
then theory is only meaningful if it can be used as an instrument.
This is a non sequitur.
2. Description
According to Friedman, "[t]he ultimate goal of a positive
science is the development of a 'theory' or 'hypothesis' that yields
valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena
not yet observed."" A theory has two elements: "In part, it is a
'language' designed to promote 'systematic and organized methods
of reasoning.' In part it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed
to abstract essential features of complex reality.""" That is, the
primary goal of science is prediction. Moreover, the only relevant
test of a theory is falsification:
The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted
("frequently" or more often than predictions from an
alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its predictions are not
contradicted; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived
many opportunities for contradiction. Factual evidence can
never "prove" a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which
is what we generally mean when we say, somewhat inexactly,
that the hypothesis has been "confirmed" by experience."^
Friedman concludes from this that it is not a criticism of a theory to
say that its assumptions are unrealistic. This is so not only because
the realism, or lack thereof, of assumptions is irrelevant to the
validity of a theory."' Rather, Friedman goes further and maintains
that "[t]o be important... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in
its assumptions.""' In other words, Friedman can be interpreted to
assert that falsity of assumptions is an affirmatively good thing.
As I shall discuss in greater detail below, Friedman's defenders
suggest that, in the immediate context in which these statements are
made, Friedman can be read as equating "realism" with a
photographic reproduction of all concrete details of a phenomenon
38 See id.
39 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 7.
40 Id. (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 9.
42 Friedman asserts that the "widely held view" that "the conformity of... 'assumptions'
to 'reality' is a test of the validity of the hypothesis" is "fundamentally wrong and productive
of much mischief." Id. at 14.
43 Id.
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and "unrealism" with abstraction. For example, at one point he
states: "A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of
complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to
be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them
alone.'""
Friedman also concludes that "the relevant question to ask
about... 'assumptions'... [is] whether they are sufficiently good
approximations for the purpose in hand" which is good
prediction."' If all Friedman had intended to say—albeit in
idiosyncratic and potentially misleading language was that
abstraction is a necessary part of any analytical process, then his
essay would never have caused such a sensation.
The controversy arises because other statements made by
Friedman suggest that he takes a giant step beyond this relatively
uncontroversial view of abstraction and asserts that the assumptions
behind a theory have no necessary relationship to "truth" per se. He
does not merely identify realism with concreteness and umealism
with abstraction, he suggests further that he might accept as scientific
a theory based on assumptions that are either demonstrably false or
outright fantastic. That is, he sometimes seems to use the word
"unreal" in the colloquial sense of "nonreal" or false. Consequently,
Friedman suggests that neoclassical theory need not posit that
economic subjects are actually economically rational, or even that
they in fact tend to act as if they were economically rational, but that
one can make good economic predictions if one assumes that
economic subjects act as if they were economically rational, whether
or not they actually are or so act."' This interpretation is the F-twist.
3.

Explanation

Despite Friedman's assertion, not all scientists, or all
economists, accept the proposition that theory is primarily
instrumental in nature. Although Samuelson, like Friedman, tries to
avoid the inevitable epistemological and metaphysical implications
of what it might mean to have knowledge of the object world, he
does insist that the point of science is precisely to describe the
universe."^ Samuelson is an unrepentant descriptivist who asserts
that it "is fundamentally wrong [to think] that umealism in the sense
of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is

44
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Id.
Id. at 15.
See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-85.
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anything but a demerit for a theory or hypothesis
Accordingly, he calls Friedman's methodology "a monstrous
perversion of science.""'
Samuelson may go too far: many philosophers of science find
pure descriptivism to be as naive and as objectionable as pure
instrumentalism. Indeed, descriptivism has been described as a
"poor man's version of instrumentalism."'"
Herbert Hovenkamp offers a more modest, but well-taken
criticism of instrumentalism—^at least as it is practiced in law and
economics:
An important consequence of instrumentalism is to place strict
limits on the domain of any particular hypothesis. A hypothesis
that has survived testing in a particular context might fare
poorly when used elsewhere. Statements within a given
economic model are deemed "true" because that model yields
better predictions with respect to a certain question than does
some alternative model. When the question changes, the model
must be reexamined by empirical testing and comparison with
alternative hypotheses.'^
By the very logic of instrumentalism, then, one carmot conclude
from the observation that a set of "assumptions" results in accurate
predictions in one context that the same set of "assumptions" wiU
also be a good predictor in another context. This conclusion is, in
fact, a new hypothesis that needs to be separately falsified—to
accept it as something more is to confuse a new prediction with an
assumption.
Although Simon, the father of behavioral economics, agrees
with Friedman in the sense that he thinks that economic theory
should serve an instrumental purpose, he sharply distinguishes his
own methodology from Friedman's. Simon beheves that good
prediction only flows from the understanding that accurate
description brings. That is, according to Simon, if "we want [an]
economic theor[y]... to help guide the actual management and
operation of firms,"'^ then:
[I]t must be a theory that describes [the operations of firms]
realistically, not an "as if" theory. In both its descriptive and its
normative aspects, it must describe, and prescribe for, the
decision making processes of managers with close attention to
48 2 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A.
SAMUELSON 1774 (I.E. Stiglitz ed., 1966), quoted in BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97.
49 Id.
50 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 99 (citations omitted).
51 Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 827.

52 HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS 62 (1997)
[hereinafter SIMON, MICROECONOMICS].
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the kinds of knowledge that are attainable and the kinds of
computations that can actually be carried out."
As we shall see, despite some vociferous language, it is not clear
whether Friedman—or Posner for that matter—is quite the pure
instrumentalist and antidescriptivist he claims to be.
As I mentioned briefly in the introduction and develop at length
elsewhere,'" whatever the goals of scientific theory, instrumentalism
and prediction should not be the only test of legal analysis. Indeed, a
fundamental difference in goals is one of the reasons why law-andeconomics scholars and their critics consistently fail to communicate.
Law and economics is a policy science—it seeks to give advice to
legislators, judges, or others in power regarding what the law should
be in order to achieve certain societal objectives. As such it must
both identify what these goals should be (such as pareto optimality
or wealth maximization) and predict how legal and economic
subjects will respond to incentives or disincentives created by the
law. In other words, the policy scientist seeks to use law to
manipulate the behavior of those who are subject to its power.
There is nothing wrong about this per se—it is the very nature of
legal policy making.
ITie speculative theorist or critical legal scholar, in contrast,
seeks not so much to give advice to the government, but to
understand the position of the governed—those who are subjected
to the law. The critical position is not that of the legislator or the
judge, but of the attorney who counsels and represents clients. By
understanding how the law affects her and her client, the lawyer and
critical scholar can seek better to integrate the individual legal
subject within the legal system—whether with other legal subjects
through contract, or with the government through compliance.
Through understanding, she seeks to free the legal subject from
manipulation by the law. The legal subject who understands the law
can now either freely submit to the law, seek to manipulate the law
for her own individualistic and subjective goals, or seek to change
the law. In the terms of Lacanian discourse theory, the critical
scholar speaks a discourse of the Hysteric, whereas the legal
economist speaks a discourse of the University." In the former, one
stands in the position of the person subjected to the law who
addresses the law itself. In the latter, one stands in the position of
the legal expert who addresses the instrumental purpose of the law.
As neither addresses the other directly, communication fails.
Consequently, the critical scholar who says, in effect, "look what the
53 Id. at 63.
54 See sources cited supra note 10.
55 I explain this analysis in Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 10.
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law is doing to me" is never effectively heard by the pohcy scientist
who can only respond "this is the purpose of the law." For
communication to occur, one of the two parties must step out of her
own discourse and engage in a linking discourse. Lacan called this
third discourse, the discourse of the Analyst.
There are many different types of "explanation" in science and
elsewhere. Philosopher of science Ernest Nagel gives ten examples
of different types of scientific explanation, which he then groups into
four categories: (1) the deductive model; (2) probabihstic
explanations; (3) functional or teleological explanations; and (4)
genetic explanations.^®
At first blush, the Friedman-Posner
methodology would seem to fall within the first, deductive model,
which is commonly used in the natural sciences. This type of
explanation "has the formal structure of a deductive argument, in
which the explicandum is a logically necessary consequence of the
explanatory premises.""
Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that Friedman
and Posner's view of science inverts the deductive explanation. A
deductive explanation would posit that rational behavior by
economic subjects would result in a downward-sloping demand
curve; therefore, the reason the demand curve slopes downward is
because economic subjects are rational. That is, economists would
initially observe the surprising fact of downward-sloping demand
curves and abduct the hypothesis that this could be explained if
economic subjects behaved in a certain way (i.e., were economically
"rational").
Economists would then test this hypothesis by
structuring controlled observations of economic subjects to see if
they in fact acted rationally. If they did not (i.e., if the hypothesis is
not falsified) then one has reason to continue to accept the
hypothesis.
In contrast, Friedman and Posner can be read as saying that, if
we assume that economic subjects act "as if" they were rational, then
we would predict that demand curves would slope downward. This
hypothesis would be tested by engaging in controlled observation of
demand curves to see if one could observe any that were upward
sloping. Theirs is, however, a "theory" that in fact predicts nothing.
It is merely a post hoc explanation of a phenomenon already
observed, namely downward-sloping demand curves. Moreover, as

56 See ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SQENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE IX)GIC OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 21-26 (2d ed. 1979).
57 Id. at 21. Nagel points out that this "has been widely regarded as the paradigm for any
'genuine' explanation and, has often been adopted as the ideal form." Id. Nevertheless, even
in the natural sciences this ideal is often impossible in practice: "[F]ew if any experimental
scientists today believe that their explicanda can be shown to be inherently necessary." Id.
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formulated by Friedman and Posner, this theory does not even
suggest "why" demand curves slope downward because it does not
purport to tell us how economic actors really think or act. As we
shah see, it only suggests that downward-sloping demand curves are
consistent with the hypothesis that economic actors act "as if' they
were rational.^® But, as Gary Becker among others has suggested,
downward-sloping demand curves are equally consistent with certain
types of nonrational behavior.'' Consequently, Friedman and
Posner's methodology gives no way to choose between rival
"explanations"—other than aesthetics.®" As I discuss below,®i
although Friedman and Posner claim to be scientific, from the
perspective of the Popperian school of falsification this may, in fact,
be an unscientific way of moving from hypothesis formation to
"proof."
B.

The Role of Assumptions and the Unreality Principle
1.

Unrealistic Assumptions: Abstract or False?

Friedman (and Posner) claim both that theories are predictive,
rather than descriptive, and that, therefore, theoretical assumptions
are necessarily unrealistic.®^ This claim, however, depends upon
questionable definitions that conflate description with both reahsm
and a perfect reproduction of all the details of an empirical
phenomenon.
There is more than one way to interpret Friedman and Posner.
When they say that theories are not accurate descriptions they might
just be using very odd language to make the well-recognized
distinction between the abstract and concrete.®' For example, when
Posner speaks of the lack of realism of theories, he cites the failure
of theories to "capture the full complexity, richness, and confusion of
the phenomena[,]"®'' and refers to realism as "descriptive
completeness."®' As I have already mentioned in passing, if this
were all that they meant, then Posner and Friedman would be
relatively noncontroversial. I shall return to this.®®
Friedman and Posner would also be relatively noncontroversial
if they were interpreted as merely describing Poppperian
58
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See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
See infra text accompanying notes 127-28.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
64 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
65 Id.
66 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
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falsification, albeit in a particularly idiosyncratic vocabulary.
Friedman's assertion that the realism of assumptions is irrelevant
and that theories are only tested by predictive power, could be
merely another way of making the Popperian point that under
falsification one does not test the theory directly through verification
(i.e., in Friedman's terms, by testing the "reality" of the
assumptions). One can and should, however, test the theory
indirectly or negatively by testing the implications of the theory (by
trying to observe data inconsistent with the theory).®^ In other
words, verification is unacceptable, but falsification is acceptable.
As I discuss below, Friedman and Posner's language, however,
suggests that they go further and divorce theoretical assumptions
from any truth claims whatsoever.®^ That is, they might be taking the
F-twist: equating "unreal" with "untrue" (or at least with the
proposition that the literal truth of assumptions is irrelevant to the
validity of a theory). In which case, Friedman and Posner seem to
invite us to accept a theory as scientific, even when we know that it is
false, merely because it is useful for some purposes.
For example, Blaug characterizes Friedman as asserting that
"not only is it unnecessary for assumptions to be realistic, it is a
positive advantage if they are not: 'to be important... a hypothesis
must be descriptively false in its assumptions.'"®' Similarly, Posner
says that "lack of realism" is a "precondition of theory."™ It is
unclear precisely what they mean by this. One can argue that the
logical implication of some of Friedman's statements is that one can
ignore the empirical truth value of scientific theories so long as one
can use them as predictors.''^ That is, Friedman seems to suggest that
he would still adhere to a theory that is based on assumptions that
have been shown to be false if it could be used as a predictor.™ This
F-twist is different than the positivism of Hawking, which holds that
it is meaningless to ask whether mathematical models correspond to
some unknowable external reality," in that it suggests that we should
retain a theory even when it can be shown that it does not in fact

67 See infra Part II.B (discussing Popperian falsification).
68 See infra Part I.C.3.
69 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 91 (quoting FLTIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 14).
70 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
71 In Amartya Sen's words: "Milton Friedman... in particular, has argued powerfully in
favour of departing from truth in describing reality in the context of economic models
"

AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 434 (1982).
72 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97 ("According to Samuelson, the E-twist comes in two
versions:... [the] extreme version... ascribes positive merit to unrealistic assumptions on the
grounds that a significant theory will always account for complex reality by something simpler
than itself.").
73 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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match up with the empirical world. Let us stop and examine these
arguments in more detail. I shall return to the F-twist below.
2. Descriptivism and Instrumentalism
Despite Friedman and Posner's dismissal of descriptivism, and
despite Samuelson's agreement that his methodology of
descriptivism is indeed distinguishable from instrumentalism, many
economists have concluded that in practice there is no material
difference between the two approaches. As Amartya Sen has
pointed out, part of the reason that theorists like Friedman and
Posner reject descriptivism is that they seem to have an extremely
odd notion of what description is. They implicitly assume that
description is a passive activity of observing and reporting everything
that one sees, sparing no detail.''* For example, Friedman and
Posner claim that a description of a phenomenon is a reproduction,
not an explanation." This is, in fact, what Popper condemns as the
naive bucket view of observation, which conceptualizes the observer
as a passive receptacle of data."
In contrast, as Sen points out, a good description requires the
"choice of a subset from a set of possible statements."" Some
perfectly accurate statements about a phenomenon can be
"unhelpful, even useless."" Consequently, the describer must first
identify the purpose of the description. In Popper's terminology, the
scientific observer is a searchlight that actively singles out specific
details for examination."
In other words, observation and
description are themselves forms of abstraction.
By asserting that the sole purpose of scientific theory is
prediction, Friedman and Posner seem to ignore the possibility that
many details that could be included in a description might be
irrelevant or harmful for one purpose, although these details might
serve some other valid scientific purpose: "Description may well be
geared to some objective other than prediction, e.g., normative
analysis, or efficient communication, or even satisfying idle
curiosity."^"
In other words, one might describe the same

74 See SEN, supra note 71, at 433.
75 In Posner's words: "A theory that sought faithfully to reproduce the complexity of the
empirical world in its assumptions would not be a theory—an explanation—but a
description." PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
76 See infra note 210.
77 SEN, SUPRA note 71, at 447.
78 Id. at 433. Sen gives the example of an expert answering a question about factory wages
in India with the answer, "It varies from place to place." Id.
79 See infra note 210.
80 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 439.
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phenomenon differently depending on one's purpose, and yet each
description might be "true" within the standards of its purpose.
Once one identifies a purpose, one then needs to choose what
aspects of the phenomenon to be described are relevant to that
purpose. For example, Friedman offers the specious argument that a
"reahstic" description of a businessman would include his eye and
hair color and various other personal characteristics that a proper
economic model ignores.®' Sen replies:
In assessing this objection it is necessary to consider the
distinction between realism in the sense of "nothing but the
truth" and that in the sense of "the whole truth." An
assumption can be realistic in that it is true without the claim
being made that it is exhaustive in capturing all aspects of the
reality. Advocates of realism in the sense of "nothing but the
truth" need not demand "the whole truth."®^

A good explanation is one that first determines the purpose of the
description in the sense of what question is being asked; second,
determines what facts about the phenomena to be described are
relevant to that question; and third, abstracts these elements from
the concrete examples of the phenomena actually observed. This
type of description is arguably indistinguishable from falsification.
This seems to be the type of description that Samuelson has in mind.
As I discuss in Economic Rationality,^^ Samuelson's model of
economic rationality—revealed preference theory or "RPT"—is
perhaps even more abstract than Friedman's in that it claims to
eliminate utihty (and therefore ends-means reasoning) entirely.
As Sen says of both Friedman and Samuelson's approach:
"[Djespite some predictive merits [it is] remarkably mute about
human joys and sufferings in which economists used to take a lot of
interest. The result is a descriptive impoverishment from many
perspectives, including—among others—normative relevance
"®''
I would argue that this critique is even stronger with respect to
Posner than Friedman, since Posner purports to apply economic
analysis to a wide variety of subjects having great normative import,
such as human sexuality and family relations.
In Sen's words:
Predicting future choice on the basis of past choice is not in
itself a bad predictive strategy (despite some well-known
problems). But if that is used as the only focus of the theory of
utility, then there is either silence on many important issues

81 See SEN, supra note 71, at 437-38.
82 Id. at 438.
83 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
84 SEN, supra note 71, at 442.
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(when "utility" is treated as just another name for a numerical
reflector of choice), or there is a good deal of senseless noise.^^

3.

Abstraction

As I have suggested, one could argue that Friedman's
realistic/unrealistic dichotomy might merely be intended to reflect
the concrete/abstract distinction. Posner sometimes makes this
identification expressly. For example, in a paragraph arguing for the
unreality of theories he states that "abstraction is of the essence of
scientific inquiry."®^ In Blaug's words:
The assumptions of economic theory are sometimes said to be
"unrealistic" in the sense of being abstract
[T]his is
certainly one of Friedman's meanings: "realistic" assumptions
are descriptively accurate in the sense that they take account of
all the relevant background variables and refuse to leave any of
them out.^'

Martha Nussbaum makes a similar point: "Milton Friedman long
ago correctly argued that positive economics, like other sciences, can
and should use simple assumptions that do not in all respects
correspond to the complex phenomenology of real human action."®^
It is a very different thing, however, to assert that an "abstract"
description is less "realistic" than a "concrete" one. The very nature
of abstraction arguably implies some type of truth-statement about
the class of things being abstracted. That is, when one abstracts
something, one is not asserting that one has identified all
characteristies of the thing described, but that one has identified
those shared characteristics of a class of objects that are relevant for
the purposes at hand. Such description implicitly claims to be "real"
in the sense that it identifies the true essence of a phenomenon by
wirmowing away extraneous detail.®' That is, the fact that models are
not "the whole truth" does not necessarily mean that they are not
"the truth... and nothing but the truth." Consequently, Nussbaum
declares: "What is at issue is the question whether the assumptions
85 Id.

86 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
87 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 92.
88 Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197,1201 (1997).
89 As Gary Lawson says: "It may seem so obvious that a normative model cannot
properly make use of incoherent or empty concepts. To evaluate actions by reference to
an incoherent or nonexistent standard borders on a definition of psychosis." Gary Lawson,
Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53,76 (1992). Nevertheless, Lawson suggests that
one might carefully use empty concepts for limited purposes. For exeunple, one might use a
model as a proxy for a true moral theory, if one thought that the model led to relatively
accurate predictions and was easier to apply. See id. at 76-77. Lawson generously interprets
Posner as taking this relatively modest approach. See id. at 77.
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are too crude, so oversimple that they fail to single out those aspects
of the world that are most salient for predictive purposes.'""
Although Nagel does not refer to Friedman directly, he seems
to have Friedman implicitly in mind in his discussioii of certain
methodological problems encountered in economics.
One
difference between practitioners of the "natural" sciences and most
social scientists is that the former try to develop universal laws, while
the latter tend to make statistical generalizations.'^ Some social
scientists, most notably economists,'^ have sought to develop a
methodology to make their fields more like the natural sciences.
This requires an understanding of the nature of scientific laws—a
goal that the Friedman article approaches but does not attain.
In Nagel's words:
[T]he terms used in the universal laws of many branches of
science usually have a quite precise connotation, and frequently
signify traits that are more or less "idealized" versions of
actually observed properties. Each such term is in consequence
intended to designate some class of items that are highly
homogeneous in certain indicated respects; and a law
containing such terms is neither expected to be, nor is it
actually, in strict agreement with observed data
"

That is, although scientific laws require simplified, abstracted
concepts, these concepts are nevertheless intended to be true, at
least in the sense of accurate, in that they capture certain shared
characteristics of the class of things being studied. The scientist
simplifies and idealizes in order to identify the essential aspects of
the class of things that is relevant to the task at hand: "[U]niversal
laws formulated in terms of distinctions more subtle than is
necessary for achieving the objectives of empirical research, may be
just so much dead lumber. A high-powered microscope is not an
improvement on a simple magnifying glass as an instrument for
reading small print.'""
Consequently, when neoclassical economics starts from an
assumption that economic actors are "rational," this does not
necessarily imply that humans are economically rational at all times,
or in all circumstances. It could merely mean that economic
rationality is one "true" moment that can be abstracted from human
nature. There could be other equally "true" moments. To suggest
that there might be an economically irrational as well as an
economically rational moment does not necessarily imply that
90
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Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 1201.
See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 503-05.
See id. at 508-09.
Mat505.
Id. at 508.
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human behavior is unpredictable, as Posner assumes.'^ It might be
possible to develop a predictive theory of when one aspect of human
nature might be expected to prevail and when other aspects might.
This is, in fact, the approach of many philosophical systems, most
notably Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, which I
discuss at length elsewhere.'^
If one were to take such an approach, then Friedman would be
correct in saying that testing for market behavior predicted by the
assumption of economic rationality may not necessarily have any
imphcations for the truth of the assumption that human beings are
essentially economically rational for all purposes. Indeed, despite
Posner's assertion of the possible unreality of the rationality
assumption, the very thing many of Posner's critics (such as myself)
find most objectionable about his theory is precisely that he
imphcitly concludes from evidence that the rationality postulate is an
accurate predictor of some market behavior, that the rationality
postulate is a vahd description of human nature and a predictor of
behavior in other areas. Probably the most notorious example of
this is Posner's analysis of htunan sexuahty. In Nussbaum's words:
"Posner's descriptions of human sexuality, in Sex and Reason, do not
convey the sense that we are looking at sex the way people generally
look at it; instead, a perspective of lofty detachment has flattened
and simplified things that are usually messy and real."" As I shall
discuss,'^ despite his claims, Posner usually uses his theory to explain
aheady observed data, rather than predicting unobserved data.
Moreover, when he does make predictions he engages in the easy
but unrehable methodology of verification—predicting data that
would be consistent
his hypothesis—rather than the more
difficult and reliable one of falsification—predicting data that would
be inconsistent with his hypothesis. In any event, despite his call for
lawyers and judges to make empirically based decisions," Posner
does not in fact do the observational work that would either verify or
falsify his hypotheses.
The problem of overbreadth that I identify in Posner is
precisely one of the dangers that concerned Friedman. Nevertheless,
95 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559 ("The rational-choice
economist asks what 'rational man' would do in a given situation, and usually the answer is
pretty clear
But it is profoundly unclear what 'behavioral man' would do in any given
situation.... He might do anything."); id. at 1575 ("Behavioral man behaves in unpredictable
ways.").
96 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8; Schroeder, Fear of Freedom, supra
note 9.
97 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 1200.
98 See infra notes 273-89 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 5, at 5-8.
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although Friedman resists, one could certainly conclude that, despite
the fact that the predictions of the rationality postulate have not
been falsified in certain specific circumstances, there exists at least
some evidence that the rationality postulate has something "true" to
say about actual human behavior in these circumstances. In Nagel's
words: "[I]t is possible in many branches of natural science to state
laws as universally valid under certain 'ideal' conditions and for
'pure cases' of the phenomena investigated
What critics such as Samuelson and myself object to in
Friedman and Posner is that they arguably leap fiom an appropriate
rejection of the standard of "the whole truth," to a rejection of
"nothing but the truth," to a rejection of realism entirely, which
comes very close to holding not merely that truth is not a necessary
condition of a scientific theory, but that fiction has a positive value in
a theory.
That is, Friedman argues not only that accuracy of prediction is
the only test of the validity of a hypothesis, but also that the
conformity of the underlying "assumptions" of the hypothesis to
reality is not an additional test of the hypothesis.Friedman's critics
have accused him of asserting that the validity of a theory has
nothing to do with the vahdity of the underlying assumptions (so that
one cannot prove a theory valid by proving the assumptions, and the
fact that a theory is a good predictor does not imply that its
underlying assumptions are true). It is now time to turn to the
interpretation of Friedman's theory that Samuelson calls the "Ftwist,"'® and Simon calls the "unreality principle."^"^
4. Defending Friedman Against the F-twist Accusation
What does Posner mean when he states that the validity of
economic theory is not dependent on the accuracy of its assumptions
as to the rationality of economic actors? Is Posner merely repeating
Friedman, or is he misinterpreting him? Blaug shows that if one
carefully parses Friedman's language, one can make an argument
100 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508.
101 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 14.
102 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97. As I shall discuss, although Friedman's sloppy language
gives Samuelson plenty of ammunition, it is not clear that Friedman ever really adopts the
strong form of the F-twist, although Posner certainly does. One can, however, also chide
Samuelson for adopting a soft form of F-twisting in practice. As I discuss in Economic
Rationality, Samuelson proposes his theory of revealed preferences precisely because he
implicitly thinks that we cannot reliably determine the actual subjective states of economic
subjects. Consequently, he makes no attempt to empirically test his hypothesis that choices
reveal preferences. As a result, he comes very close to asserting that people act "as if their
choices coincided with their preferences. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
103 See, e.g.,2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION) xix (1982) [hereinafter SIMON, MODELS].
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that Friedman never quite adopts the F-twist (i.e., the proposition
that a theory can be valid even if its assumptions are patently false).
If Friedman does not adopt the F-twist, however, it is far from clear
what he is in fact saying. As we shall see, regardless of what
Friedman had in mind, Posner accepts the F-twist and gives it
another turn, arriving at his own F-twist.
Blaug tries to partially defend Friedman on the grounds of
historical context. If Friedman used extreme language in defending
the rationahty postulate, this was only because he was responding to
a methodological argument current at the time he was writing that
was itself worded in absolutist, intemperate language. Early- to midtwentieth-century critics of neoclassical economics concentrated on
attacking the strict accuracy of its imderlying assumptions while
ignoring its predictive power. That is, they attacked the abstraction
of assumptions and demanded photographic concreteness. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that defenders of neoclassical economics
would try to draw attention away from the empirical accuracy of the
model and toward its usefulness. Unfortunately, the extremist
rhetoric of the critics inspired an extremist response:
The style of this criticism, which was invariably accompanied by
the crudest of objections to the assumptions of standard theory,
paying absolutely no attention to its predictive content,
inevitably produced the reaction among defenders of received
doctrine that "assumptions are largely irrelevant." ... Taken
with the accusation that no theory with counterfactual
assumptions can be taken seriously, the thesis of the irrelevance
of assumptions is almost excusable.^""

In other words, Friedman was responding to critics that demanded
that a theory be "the whole truth," in the sense of being a totally
accurate description of a phenomenon in all respects—surely an
impossibly strict standard that no scientific theory could ever meet.
What then, does Friedman mean when he suggests that the
realism of assumptions is irrelevant, or that unrealism of assumptions
may be a virtue? First, as Blaug points out, Friedman never quite
makes the blunt statement of which Samuelson accuses him: that he
is denying the necessity of truth claims in scientific theories.
Friedman always modifies his position by saying that the realism of
assumptions is "largely" irrelevant.^"^ Indeed, interpreting Friedman
is difficult precisely because he tends to put the word "assumptions"
in quotation marks and never defines his terms.^°®

104 Id.
105 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97.
106 See id. at 94.
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[Friedman] does not even explicitly distinguish between initial
conditions, auxiliary hypotheses, and boundary conditions....
[AJssumptions in economics may refer to (1) statements of
motivation such as utility and profit maximization; (2)
statements of overt behavior of economic agents; (3) statements
of the existence and stability of certain functional relationships;
(4) restrictions on the range of variables to be taken into
account; and (5) boundary conditions under which the theory is
held to apply.

Blaug takes Friedman to task for his naive "notion that theories can
be neatly divided into their essential components and that the
empirical searchlight is to be directed solely at the implications and
never at any other parts of the theory
Indeed, Friedman
does argue, in what Blaug describes as "a frequently overlooked
section""' of his essay, that assumptions can be used as an indirect
test of a theory."" Friedman's plaint against testing assumptions
might be just another form of denying the validity of verification as a
methodology.
That is, Friedman might be using the term
"assumptions" to mean affirmative statements of presumed
grounding facts on which a theory is based. To test an assumption
might, therefore, be considered an attempt to verify these facts.
Thus we can paraphrase Blaug's attempt to give Friedman the
benefit of the doubt and rewrite his reliance on the dubious
distinction between the assumptions and implications of a theory as
follows. First, when examining a theory, it is not useful to distinguish
between what is an assumption and what is a conclusion, let alone
between types of assumptions. Consequently, a theory should be
tested as a whole, not with respect to its component parts. This is so
partly because, in order to theorize, one needs to abstract from
concrete, empirical reality. Abstraction is the identification of
salient points for a specific purpose, i.e., for use as part of a theory.
The test of the appropriateness of an abstraction, therefore, should
be a test of how it works in the context of the theory. Friedman
believes that the use of economic theory should be prediction of
economic behavior. This means that the test of a theory is whether
all of its component parts, taken as a whole, serve this purpose (i.e.,
whether the theory makes accurate predictions).
Second, when Friedman asserts that assumptions may, or
must, be unrealistic (or that lack of realism is a virtue in
theorization), he is not necessarily suggesting that economists
should go out and seek to make their assumptions unrealistic.
Id.
Id. at 104.
109 Id. at 93.
110 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 26-30.
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Indeed, his description of theory formation has much in common
with Popperian methodology. That is, one does not draw one s
starting assumptions out of thin air. One starts with empirical data
as the basis of the initial hypothesis—one engages in abduction in
order to try to explain a surprising thing. According to Friedman:
Empirical evidence is vital at two different, though closely
related, stages: in constructing hypotheses and in testing their
validity. Full and comprehensive evidence of the phenomena to
be generalized or "explained" by a hypothesis, besides its
obvious value in suggesting new hypotheses, is needed to assure
that a hypothesis explains what it sets out to explain—that its
implications for such phenomena are not contradicted m
advance by experience that has already been observed.
In other words, one's working assumptions are grounded in
empirical observation. In this context, what Friedman seems to be
suggesting is that one does not then test the hypothesis drawn from
these initial assumptions by seeking to verify the assumpbons
themselves, but by seeking to falsify the implications drawn from
these assumptions.^^^
• a
The problem with these generous interpretations of Friedman is
that they fly in the face of other statements made in his essay. As
Blaug points out, Friedman suggests that assumptions underlying
theories might be unrealistic in two ways other than abstraction. An
assumption might be unrealistic because it does not "ascribe n^otwes
to economic actors that we, fellow human bemgs, find
comprehensible.""^ That is, as I shall discuss below Friedman
rejects what is known as the Verstehen doctrine, or "methodological
individualism.""" Second, assumptions may be unrealistic in the
sense that they "are believed to be either false or highly improbable
in light of directly perceived evidence
As we shall see,""" in at least one example given in his essay,
Friedman proposes assumptions that are not merely abstract or
partially true, but are completely and irrefutably false. Morewer,
Friedman's methodology should be distinguished at this point from
Popper's. In contrast. Popper only suggested that the initw/working
assumptions of a proposed hypothesis were "irrelevant" to the
scientific process; he did not suggest that the truth or reality of a
theory's ultimate assumptions was irrelevant."" This is because
in
112
113
114

M a t 12.
See id. at 13-14.
BLAUG, supra note 18, at 92.
See discussion infra Part I.C.4.
115 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 93.
116 See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
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falsification allows a scientist to eliminate serially all false
assumptions. Consequently, if scientists are unable to falsify a
theory after repeated experimentation, then one has reason to
believe that any assumptions that remain standing after falsification
are true. In other words, we can safely ignore the question of the
validity of our initial assumptions only if, like Popper, we are
confident that all false assumptions can eventually be eliminated
through falsification.
In other words, Popperian falsification is a methodology
designed precisely to determine the truth or falsity of assumptions.
Perhaps the most generous reading of Friedman's approach is that
Friedman retained a healthy skepticism as to Popper s epistemology
and continued to question the assertion that man can achieve
metaphysical knowledge through science. If one accepts Popper s
assertion that all scientific theories are fallible and corrigible, then
one can never get beyond mere intersubjective consensus to
"objective" truth."®
5. The Practicability of Falsifying Assumptions
As we have seen, it is not Friedman's preference for falsification
that is remarkable (since this is a widely, but far from universally,
accepted notion of scientific methodology). Rather, it is his
suggestion that one cannot also directly test a theory by falsifying (as
opposed to verifying) its assumptions, or his implication that the
truth of a theory has no relationship to the truth of the assumption.
Part of Friedman's argument seems implicitly to be based on the
assertion that we cannot directly test the assumptions of the
rationality postulate because it is difficult, if not impossible, to test
assertions about the subjective mind-sets of economic actors.
Ironically, as I discuss in Economic Rationality, although Samuelson
considers himself a critic of Friedman's methodology, Samuelson's
own theory of revealed preferences ("RPT") is similarly founded on
the alleged problematics of directly observing the subjective
preferences that constitute the base assumptions of the rationality
postulate."' But if Friedman's claim is merely based on an assertion
of empirical difficulty, then he should be open to suggestions about
how these difficulties might be overcome."" Indeed, his critics pomt

118 Consequently, in Popper's words: "The game of science is, in principle, without end"

POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 53.
n9 See Schioeder, Economic Rationality, supra note

120 5ee BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96. Sen makes a similar point m his critique of he
methodology of Friedman's arch-rival, Paul Samuelson. Samuelson's theory of revealed
preferences is based on the implicit, but untested, assumption that there is no reliable
means of testing people's actual preferences and subjective states. As Sen suggests.

2001]

JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY

377

out that the testing of predictions suffers from precisely the same
type of empirical difficulties and ambiguities as the testing of
assumptions: "[Djirect evidence about assumptions is not necessarily
more difficult to obtain than data about market behavior used to test
predictions or, rather,... the results of examining assumptions are
not any more ambiguous than the results of testing
predictions
Moreover, his critics assert, if Friedman truly believes that
"accurate predictions are ... the only relevant test of the vahdity of a
theory[,]... [then] it would be impossible to distinguish between
genuine and spurious correlations ...
Friedman anticipates this
criticism and attempts to preempt it with a version of Ockham's
razor: "The choice among alternate hypotheses equally consistent
with the available evidence must to some extent be arbitrary, though
there is general agreement that relevant considerations are
suggested by the criteria 'simphcity' and 'fruitfulness,' themselves
notions that defy completely objective specification."'^^ Elegance
and beauty are, indeed, characteristics of many successful scientific
theories. Moreover, even arch-falsifier Popper agreed that there is a
necessary aesthetic or, in his words, "subjective"'^" aspect in the
choice of one's initial hypothesis. Popper, however, sought to
distinguish the subjective moment in all human activity from the
objective one of scientific methodology.'^^ As we shall see. Popper
argued that his proposed method of falsification was precisely a
method of testing one's initial hypothesis in order objectively and
scientifically to choose one's final hypothesis.'^® Ironically, Friedman
and Posner wind up promoting not falsification, as they claim, but
the theory proposed by falsification's most well-known critic,
Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn famously argued that there is no logical way to
[The] thrust of the revealed preference approach has been to undermine
thinking as a method of self-knowledge and talking as a method of knowing
about others. In this, [Sen thinks], we have been prone, on the one hand, to
overstate the difficulties of introspection and communication, and on the other,
to underestimate the problems of studying preferences revealed by observed
behaviour.
SEN, supra note 71, at 72.
Similarly, Friedman's insistence that assumptions not be tested directly, but only
indirectly by testing implications, might overstate the difficulties of doing the former and
underestimate the difficulties of doing the latter.
121 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96.
122 Id.
123 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10.
124 POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31.
125 Popper characterized his project as that of "demarcation"—distinguishing what he
seemed to consider the uniquely reliable process called "science" from other useful processes
such as "common sense." See id. at 19-20,34.
126 See infra text accompanying notes 209-18.
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choose between rival paradigms so one must inevitably fall back on
"good," but nonobjective, reasons like "accuracy, scope, simplicity,
fruitfulness, and the like."^^^ Similarly, Friedman concludes that the
choice between hypotheses is "to some extent arbitrary" but that
"relevant considerations" include "simphcity" and "fruitfulness."^^®
In addition to questioning the empirical difficulty of testing
assumptions, and raising the false correlation problem, Friedman's
critics have argued:
[T]he attempt to test assumptions may yield important insights
that help us to interpret the results of predictive tests; and ... if
predictive testing of theories with patently counterfactual
assumptions is indeed all that we can hope for, we ought to
demand that our theories be put to extremely severe tests.^^'

C.

Arguments Drawn from the "Hard" Sciences
1.

Misdescription of Galileo

Friedman tries to defend his assertion as to the irrelevance of
the realism of assumptions by reference to physics. An examination
of his example shows that Friedman's description is either worded in
a misleading way or evidences a fundamental confusion about the
laws of physics (and, once again, about the concepts of "partial" and
"abstract" on the one hand and "unrealistic" or "nontrue" on the
other). Accordingly, Friedman's description of the laws of physics
has rightfully become a lightning rod for attacks by his critics.
Friedman notoriously gives the example of the laws of falhng
bodies as first proposed by Gahleo and developed by Newton.^®"
Fosner repeats the same example, without attribution."^ Friedman
states that the law is unrealistic because it "assumes" that bodies fall
in vacuums."^ "Testing this hypothesis by its assumption presumably
means measuring the actual air pressure and deciding whether it is

127 Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF

KNOWLEDGE 231, 261 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn,
Reflections].

128 FRIEDMAN,
note 12, at 10.
129 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96.
130 For simplicity, I will follow Friedman in writing as though Newton's laws of motion
were still the accepted scientific paradigm. It is common knowledge that Newtonian physics
has been supplanted by Einsteinian physics and quantum mechanics. It is not the case that
Newtonian physics is still theoretically true for the macroworld, but Einsteinian physics rules
the microworld. Nevertheless, Newtonian physics approximates the movement of bodies in
the macroworld with sufficient accuracy to serve for law professors to ignore Friedman's
inaccuracy.
131 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18.
132 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 18.
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close enough to zero.""^ It is common knowledge that cannonballs
and feathers fall at different speeds in the atmosphere.^^^ Friedman
concludes that scientists accept the law of falling objects only with
respect to the objects that fall in an atmosphere in a way that is
sufficiently close to that predicted in a vacuum to say that the theory
"works" for those objects, but not in those circumstances when it
doesn't "work."^^' Consequently, according to Friedman, we arcept
the theory as "working" for things like cannonballs, but reject it for
things like feathers."®
Friedman concludes from this that scientists accept the law ot
falling bodies for cannonballs despite its "unrealistic" assumption
that cannonballs fall in vacuums. Moreover, he asserts; "This
example illustrates both the impossibility of testing a theory by its
assumptions and also the ambiguity of the concept 'the assumptions
of a theory.'""^ He rewrites the theory of falling bodies to mean:
"[Ujnder a wide range of circumstances, bodies that fall in the actual
atmosphere behave as if they were falling in a vacuum.
Before proceeding, we should note that, even though Friedman
claims that the assumption that objects fall in a vacuum is
"unrealistic," the theory of falling bodies purports to say somethmg
about how objects do fall in a vacuum that is "true" in the limited
sense that it describes observed motion. Moreover, although it
might be correct to suggest that Galileo, Newton, et aL abducted the
theory of falling bodies by abstracting from empirical observation of
actual bodies falling in the earth's atmosphere, it is not correct to say
that the only way scientists test this theory is by further observation
133 Id. at 16. Posner similarly writes: "Newton's law of falling bodies is unrealistic in its
basic assumption that bodies fall in a vacuum...POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra
"°i34 ptobably all of us have heard at some point the anecdote that Galileo iiwtituted the era
of modern scientific experimentation, which supplanted the earlier Aristotelian speculative
science, by demonstrating that objects of different weight fall at the saine si^ed by dropping
two objects from the Leaning Tower of Pisa and observing that both hit the ground at the
same time. A moment's thought will reveal that this must be a myth became m the earth s
atmosphere objects of different weights or sizes usually fall at different speeds. Galiko s new
methodology consists not merely of empirical observation, but also of the ability of abstracti g
eenerally applicable rules from diverse empirical data.
135 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 17. Posner says the law of falling boAes

is still a useful
theory because it predicts with reasonable accuracy the behavior of a wide vanety of falling
bodies in the real world." POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. Fnedman
does correctly note that one needs to decide what it means to say that something work^hat
is what standard to apply. Presumably, given that Friedman's goal is predictability, the
answer to this question would be based on what one wishes to predict and the degree of
accuracy one is seeking. A thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this
Article.
136 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 17.
137
138

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
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of objects in the earth's atmosphere. Nor is it correct to say that
scientists who theorize about movement—or even engineers who use
this theory for practical purposes—^accept the theory for objects for
which this result can be replicated and reject it for other objects.
Rather, scientists try to replicate in reality the conditions of the
theory in its abstract state to see if the theory holds—d.e., they, in
fact, test the assumptions. For example, I remember seeing a science
film in elementary school in which the scientist (actor) first dropped
two objects in a glass jar containing air—demonstrating how
differently they fell in an atmospher^and then pumped the air out
of the jar and repeated the experiment. As predicted, the two
objects fell at the same speed and hit the ground at the same time.
In other words, the theory was shown to be an accurate predictor of
movement of both weights and feathers in a vacuum.
Simon aptly criticizes this aspect of Friedman's theory:
I am not satisfied with the answers to Friedman's argument that
he has as much right as the physicists to make unreal
assumptions. Was Galileo also guilty of using the invalid
principle of unreality? I think not. I think he was interested in
behaviour in perfect vacuums not because there aren't any in
the real world, but because the real world sometimes
sufficiently approximates them to make their postulation
interesting.^^'

Friedman was writing in the mid-1950s when, perhaps, the
thought of objects moving in vacuums seemed like a strange starting
place for theorization of the laws of motion. However, from the
point of view of astrophysics, hypothesizing about how planets,
satellites, and other vehicles move in the relative vacuum of space
seems completely appropriate. Indeed, I suspect that from the
vantage point of the turn of the millennium, after decades of
watching space flights on television, the proposition no longer seems
strange, let alone unrealistic, to the average American.
In his book on the nature of scientific explanation, Nagel uses
the same example to describe classic scientific methodology in a way
that is subtly, but decisively, different from Friedman. "We begin by
noting the familiar fact that the experimental evidence for the
universal laws of physical science is rarely if ever in perfect
agreement with them."^"" This certainly is one of the things that
Friedman is trying to capture when he says that science does not
merely describe phenomena in the sense of ticking off all empirical
data. In contrast to Friedman, however, Nagel interprets scientists
as very much trying to describe the phenomena to be studied as
139 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 370.
140 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508.
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accurately as practicable. In Simon's words: "[Ujnreality of premises
is not a virtue in scientific theory it is a necessary evil—a concession
to the finite computing capacity of the scientist that is made tolerable
by the principle of continuity of approximation.""^ That is, the
scientist understands that a meaningful scientific description is
hmited to those aspects of the phenomena germane to the problem
at hand. Indeed, science may be seen as the very act of such
limitation. Nagel continues:
Accordingly, if physicists were to formulate their laws in strict
adherence to what observation establishes about physical
phenomena, those laws would have a statistical rather than a
universal form. For example, had Galileo sought to establish
the laws for freely falling bodies simply by correlating observed
data, he would certainly have found that the velocity of falling
bodies varies with their weight and shape; and he would have
also found that there is only a high correlation rather than an
invariable proportionality between the distances bodies fall and
the squares of the lapsed times of their fall, so that a
generalization based entirely on these findings would have been
statistical in form."^

Friedman, therefore, is mistaken when he asserts that a more
complete theory of falling objects has been developed "largely as a
result of attempts to explain the errors of the simple theory.""^ As
the passage from Nagel makes clear, the theory that objects fall a
certain way in a vacuum is not "erroneous" because objects on earth
do not usually fall in vacuums. Rather, the theory is "true" precisely
because the necessary corollary to the theory that objects fall a
certain way in vacuums is that they should be expected to fall
differently in different circumstances that deviate from the ideal and
that the deviations should be measurable and predictable. As Simon

states:
Whatever our admiration for Galileo's law describing the fall of
a body in a vacuum, we do not use it to predict the movement
of parachutes or of meteors in the earth's atmosphere. If we
wish to test the law, we test it in vacuo or a reasonable
approximation thereto—^that is, under conditions where the
assumptions are nearly true, not under conditions where they
are egregiously false. When we apply the theory to real-world
problems, we supply such elaborations, in the form of terms to
take account of air resistance, or friction, or whatever the
sources of complication may be, as may be necessary to fit the
theory to the actual conditions of application. In imagining that
141 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 371.
142 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508.
143 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 18 (emphasis added).
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theories are used in their simplest idealized form, ignoring the
real-world complications, Friedman has drawn a fictitious
picture of how theories are actually employed in physical
science and engineering and has given bad advice as to how
they should be employed in economics."'*

Even tmder the methodology of sophisticated falsification (which I
discuss below),"' if we assume that Galileo's original formulation of
his hard-core hypothesis was merely that objects fall a certain way
(i.e., under any circumstances, without limitation to vacuums), the
hard core of this theory would not be deemed "erroneous" because
we observe that actual objects often fall at a slower speed. Nor is the
hard core necessarily falsified by this observation. The differential of
the motion of objects as observed and as predicted is, at most, an
empirical anomaly that seems inconsistent with the base or hard-core
theory of falling bodies. As I discuss below,"® pursuant to a
falsification methodology, it is the job of the scientist at this point
neither to correct "errors" in the theory nor to reject the theory.
Rather, the falsifier now tries to abduct auxiliaries to the hard core
of the theory that might explain these apparent anomalies. The
scientist then develops a research program designed to test the
auxiliaries by seeking to observe empirical data inconsistent with
them.
As I have aheady quoted, Nagel states that the methodology of
many natural sciences is to develop "laws as universally vahd under
certain 'ideal' conditions ... and to account systematically for ^y
discrepancies between what the laws assert and what observation
reveals in terms of more or less well-authenticated discrepancies
between those ideal conditions and the actual ones under which
observations are made.""' In other words, a scientific theory does
not ignore empirical reality and make unrealistic "assumptions," nor
does it merely exclude empirical phenomena that do not
approximate the predictions of the theory, as Friedman suggests.
Rather, although a theory in form may apply only to "pure cases" or
idealized versions of the phenomena to be studied, it also in practice
accounts for empirical deviations. Scientists do not, as Friedman
comes close to saying, develop one hard-core theory of objects in a
vacuum that applies to objects like cannonballs, and other theories
to correct the vacuum "error" that apply to objects like feathers.
They, instead, develop an integrated theory that accounts for the

114 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at xix.
145 See infra text accompanying notes 251-56.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 251-56.
147 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508.
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movement of all objects given atmospheric pressure and other forms
of friction.
At this stage in the argument, Friedman makes another good
point, although once again worded in misleading and idiosyncratic
terminology. He states:
[Tjhe difference in shape of the body can be said to make 15
pounds per square inch significantly different from zero for a
feather but not for a compact ball dropped a moderate distance.
Such a statement must, however, be sharply distinguished from
the very different statement that the theory does not work for a
feather because its assumptions are false. The relevant relation
runs the other way: the assumptions are false for the feather
because the theory does not work. This point needs emphasis,
because the entirely valid use of "assumptions" in specifying the
circumstances for which a theory holds is frequently, and
erroneously, interpreted to mean that the assumptions can be
used to determine the circumstances for which a theory holds,
and has, in this way, been an important source of the belief that
a theory can be tested by its assumptions."**

Note, we have just seen that Friedman's statement that the
assumptions of the law of falling bodies are false for a feather is
incorrect, because the theory does not posit that objects fall at a
certain speed under all circumstances. But, as I have argued, the
theory holds that objects fall at a certain speed under ideal
circumstances and therefore fall at different speed if actual conditions
deviate from the ideal.
Friedman's misleading terminology
unfortunately disguises the very good point in this passage. A good
theory specifies as part of the theory the conditions under which it is
valid. A theory of the movement of falling objects must specify the
conditions that affect its movement. The first law of movement
specifies that it is universally valid and that it can be directly
observed when there are no countervailing forces affecting the
movement of an object. Because a vacuum lacks the conditions of
friction caused by an atmosphere, good predictions of how objects
fall in a vacuum can be based solely on the first law of movement.
This does not mean, as Friedman imphes, that the law of motion
does not "really" apply to objects in an atmosphere, but that in order
to predict how empirical objects will actually move in a specific
atmosphere we must also consider other factors that affect the
movement of objects.
As Nagel notes, scientific theory does not merely note (as
Friedman and Posner do) that there is a discrepancy between
concrete, empirical actuality and the abstract, theoretical potentiality
148 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 19.
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of a hypothesized ideal. Rather, it seeks "to account systematically
for any discrepancies" between the actual and the ideal."" As a
daughter of an aerospace engineer who designed guidance systems
intended to deliver missiles launched from the United States to
targets in the Soviet Union and China, I know that scientists and
engineers who applied their theories believed that they knew how to
add the real-world facts of friction, etc., to the abstractions of
Newtonian theory to produce deadly accurate results.
2.
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Inapt Analogy

Even if we were to accept arguendo Friedman's misleading
terminology—i.e., that Galileo's assumptions are "unrealistic"—the
analogy between the "unreahsm" of Galileo's assumptions and the
"unreahsm" of the assumption of economic rationality fails.
As we have seen, physicists working in the Galilean tradition (as
subsequently modified over the centuries by Newton, Einstein, et
al.) abstract how objects would move in ideal conditions. This is only
"unreal" in the sense that, in the real world, the conditions under
which objects fall are rarely ideal. However, physicists assert that
the theory is nevertheless true: if we were to produce the ideal
conditions objects would so fall. And, indeed, by observing the
movement of objects in the near-ideal conditions of man-made
vacuums and of space, scientists have not been able to falsify the
theory (i.e., heretofore, objects have only been observed falling as
predicted). The nominalist skeptic might add that all that we can
know is that the objects fall "as if the theory were true—but we in
fact observe objects so moving.
This is quite different from Friedman and Posner's assertion,
which I discuss in the immediately following section, that markets act
"as if economic subjects were rational.^'" They state that it is
irrelevant that this is unrealistic in the sense that people (and firms)
frequently, or usually, do not act rationally. Note, this is not saying
that economic subjects would act rationally under ideal conditions,
which would be the proper analogy to the example drawn from
physics. If it were the same, then Friedman and Posner—like
physicists—would try to falsify their theory by trying to replicate the
ideal conditions of economic rationality and then attempt to observe
behavior inconsistent with their predictions. And yet, this is
precisely what Posner condemns when he criticizes JST!"'
149 NAGEL,iMpra note 56, at 508.
150 See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
151 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559. Posner states: "The
rational-choice economist asks what 'rational man' would do in a given situation, and
usually the answer is pretty clear and it can be compared with actual behaviour to see
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Nagel does not refer to Friedman by name, but he might have
been thinking of Friedman's essay when he criticizes the attempt by
economists to develop universal laws, like the natural sciences. If
one were to use Friedman's terminology, one might say that Nagel
does criticize the assumptions of economics—or more accurately the
way economists use these assximptions. Nagel says:
[T]he discrepancy between the assumed ideal conditions for
which economic laws have been stated and the actual
circumstances of the economic market are so great, and the
problem of supplying the supplementary assumptions needed
for bridging this gap is so difficult, that the merits of the strategy
in this domain continue to be disputed.'"
In other words, economists ignore the phenomena they are in fact
supposed to be explaining and have not adequately accounted for
discrepancies between their ideal or pure cases (i.e., then*
assumptions) and the empirical world.
3.

The "As If" Fallacy

Friedman leaps from the incorrect statement that physicists
posit that heavy, compact objects fall in an atmosphere "as if they
are in a vacuum to an assertion that the neoclassical assumption of
economic rationality is not necessarily a claim that economic actors
are in fact rational, but merely that they act as if they are
rational.'" Friedman uses the example of how an expert billiard
whether the prediction is confirmed. Sometimes it is not confirmed-and so we have
behavioral economics." Id. (citation omitted). Posner criticizes JST's attempt to take
accoimt of observed behavior that does not confirm the predictions of rationality by
characterizing it as mere "description" rather than theorization. Posner states: [Ij
rational-choice theory bumps up against some example of irrational behavior, the examp e
can be accommodated by changing the theory to allow for irrational behavior. But there
is no greater gain in predictive power ..., in fact, there is a loss." Id. at 1560. But, as w
shall see the consistent observation of data inconsistent with a theory's predictions is the
very definition of falsification.
The sophisticated falsifier must "deal with such
apparently falsifying observations, either by rejecting the theory as falsified or by adopting
auxiliaries to the original theory (in Posner's words, changing the theory). Moreover, it is
hard to see how the predictive power of the theory would be lost by this type of change if,
by Posner's own example, the observation of inconsistent behavior indicates that the
current theory does not accurately predict economic behavior. In any event, despite
Posner's criticism of the creation of auxiliaries in the light of inconsistent observations, this
is precisely what Posner in fact does.
152 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 509.
. .
153 For example, he describes the hypothesis that firms are rational profit maximizers:
[Ulnder a wide range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were
seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns... [even though]
businessmen do not actually and literally solve the system of simultaneous
equations in terms of which the mathematical economist finds fi convement to
express this hypothesis, any more than... falling bodies decide to create a
vacuum.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 21-22.
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player makes "his shots as if he, knows the complicated mathematical
formula" and "could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc.
describing the location of the balls, and could make lightning
calculations from the formulas, and could then make the balls travel
in the direction indicated by the formulas."^''' Friedman asserts that
the hypothesis that the player acts as if he did go through this process
is not dependent on the accuracy of the assumption that he actually
did go through this process. He uses this argument to support the
proposition that economists can continue to use the hypothesis that
businesses act "as if" they rationally seek to maximize profits even
though individual "businessmen do not actually and literally solve
the system of simultaneous equations in terms of which the
mathematical economist finds it convenient to express this
hypothesis any more than... billiard players explicitly go through
complicated mathematical calculations or falling bodies decide to
create a vacuum."^^^

As tempting as it might be to ridicule it, let us leave aside, as a
misstatement, Friedman's peculiar suggestion that Newton's law of
falling objects suggests that objects act as if they create vacuums, and
concentrate on his billiard player example. Once again, if all that
this example was supposed to illustrate were that, under falsification,
one cannot test hypotheses directly by trying to verify what thought
process the billiard player used (perhaps by questioning him), but
one can test them indirectly by predicting facts that would be
inconsistent with the hypothesis and then searching for such
inconsistent facts through controlled observation, it would be
unremarkable. Nor would it be particularly remarkable if Friedman
meant merely to express the common skepticism toward the
reliability of testimony about individual mental states and thought
processes (either because people frequently lack the self-critical
facility necessary for analysis or because they are prone to selfserving statements)."® Such skepticism would merely suggest that
social scientists should put more faith in their subjects' deeds than in
their words, not that economists need not study what their subjects
in fact do. But Friedman suggests that he accepts the latter, more
radical position; he asserts that either the proof of a hypothesis says
nothing about the validity of its assumptions, or that falsifying
assumptions might cast doubt on the validity of the theory.

154 Id. at 21.
155 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
156 As I discuss in Economic Rationality, such skepticism is common among economists and
underlies Samuelson's revealed preference theory. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality,
supra note 8.
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Of course, Friedman chooses the billiards example because he
assumes that it is obvious that the bUliard player is not enga^g m
the form of calculation described in his theory, but only acting as it
he did. In Friedman's words: "The billiard player, if asked how he
decides where to hit the baU, may say that he 'just f||ures it out but
then also rubs a rabbit's foot just to make sure ....
Upon closer
examination, one realizes that Friedman evinces a remarkably
unsophisticated view of consciousness and mtelligence, as well as ot
methodology and explanation.
Note that Friedman assumes that the fact that the billiard player
has no conscious awareness that he is making a calculation means
that in fact his brain is not engaging m some sunilar cognitive
activity. This implies that the only type of thinking is conscious
thought. I believe that it is noncontroversial to say that not only
psychoanalysts, but most scientists who study intelligent and
language, believe that not all thought can be so hmited. This is
shown not only in the existence of dreams, but m
moments of free association we expenence everyday. Who has not
had the experience of giving up on trymg to solve a problem t a
seems intractable only to have the solution pop mto one « head later
when one is consciously thinking of somethmg totally different (o
not consciously thinking of anything at all, as wten one wakes up in
the middle of the night with the solution)? The
°
autistic savants, like the character played by Dustm Hoffman m the
movie Rainman, also suggests that human bemgs can engage in
mathematical calculations without being conscious of the procedure^
Every computer in existence makes complex calculations^ndeed
they can make much more complex calculations than predicting the
movement of a billiard ball in much less time than it takes for a
player to make a shot-despite the fact that, as far as we can tell
thev lack any capacity for even the most primitive form o
consciousness. That is, the ability to calculate—m the sense of
processing information—is not necessarUy the same thmg as
conscious thought.
,
In other words, although Friedman may be correct from the
perspective of a falsifying methodology that one cannot prove a
theory by verifying (or even falsifying) the existence of underlymg
factual assumptions, it does not follow that the accuracy o
predictions and the truth of assumptions are totally disconnected.
Lther, the accuracy of predictions can be evidence that he
assumptions are true. The observation that one can predict the
movement of a bilUard ball through certam mathematical

157 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22.
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calculations, combined with the fact that people often engage in
complex forms of unconscious thought, could lead to the hypothesis
that a good bilhard player is one who undergoes an unconscious
mental process very much like the mathematical calculation. I said
evidence, of course, but not proof. This is because the truth of the
assumptions is merely an abduction drawn from the accuracy of the
predictions (in that it is a story that would make the accuracy of the
prediction seem to be in the ordinary course).
4.

Verstehen Doctrine

Another criticism of the "as if fallacy is that it conflicts with the
theoretical underpinnings of neoclassical economics. One of the
great methodological traditions in the social sciences is the Verstehen
doctrine, sometimes known as "methodological individualism." As
its name (German for "understanding") suggests, Verstehen doctrine
posits that a theory of human action can only be understood "from
within by means of intuition and empathy."'^® It must constitute
"first-person knowledge that is intelligible to us as fellow human
beings.'"®' Although Verstehen doctrine may not be directly
applicable to the physical sciences that deal with such things as
subatomic particles that we not only cannot empathize with, but also
that, according to quantum mechanics, seem to act in ways that have
no analogy in our everyday, macroworld experience (such as being
simultaneously located in many probability locations at one time).
Proponents insist, however, that "[n]ot only is Verstehen a necessary
characteristic of adequate explanation in the social sciences, thus
disqualifying such brands of psychology as Skinner's behaviorism,
but it is also the source of unique strength as compared to the
outsider's knowledge of physical scientists.
The primary problems of pure Verstehen doctrine should be
obvious, since subjective experience is the criterion of validity: (1)
how do we distinguish deception from truth, and (2) more broadly,
how does the community of social scientists come to intersubjective
consensus?'^' Nevertheless, one need not adopt the extreme
Verstehen view that first-person understanding is the only criterion
158 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 43.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 In other words, Verstehen may be nothing more than a form of "abduction"—the
spinning of a "just so" story that seems to offer a satisfactory account of a surprising thing. As
we have seen, abduction is hypothesis formation, and one needs another theory or
methodology to get from formation to proof. One alternative, of course, is a metaabductive
theory explaining why our guesses can be expected to be correct. For example, since the
Verstehen doctrine finds validity in empathetic understanding, it might be consistent also to
posit that all humans have an empathetic ability to understand other humans so that
intersubjective consensus can be achieved purely through empathy.
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of validity to conclude that it is a criterion of validity in the social
sciences. The failure of a social science theory to be first-person
understandable is a reason to reject the theory, because "explanation
in social science must run not in terms of physical cause and effect
but in terms of the motives and intentions of individuals."^®^
Consequently, Popper, the areh-proponent of the methodology of
falsification, was also a defender of methodological individualism—
the principle "that explanations of social, political, or economic
phenomena can only be regarded as adequate if they run in terms of
the beliefs, attitudes, and decisions of individuals."'®^ Gary Lawson
goes so far as to claim:
Methodological individualism is simply a positive statement
about the appropriate, indeed the only possible, objects of
social scientific study
[It] is simply recognition of the fact
that because the behavior of institutions is really the behavior
of individuals in particular institutional settings, "[t]he only way
to a cognition of collectives is the analysis of the conduct of its
members.'"®"

Lawson goes too far—one should not mistake his confidence in
methodological individualism and the repetition of his assertions for
a reasoned argument or demonstration. There are many intellectual
traditions—Hegelianism for one—^that posit that collectives cannot
be reduced to a mere aggregation of individuals but have unique
characteristics of their own.'®® One cannot dismiss these traditions by
mere denial without considering the arguments made in their favor.
Indeed, it is precisely the Friedman/Posner theory that markets act
"as if" economic subjects are rational that does not require that we
show that economic subjects are rational, and that adopts a
definition of rationality that neither matches our intuitions of our
own behavior nor our observations of the behavior of others, which
is implicitly a denial of methodological individualism in favor of
methodological collectivism. Nevertheless, Verstehen doctrine's

162 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 43.
163 Id. at 44.
164 Lawson, supra note 89, at 59-60 (quoting LuDWiG VON MISES, THE ULTIMATE
FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 81 (1962)).
165 That is, people act differently as part of a collective than they do as separate individuals.
Consequently, as in Hegel, the system is holistic and circular—collectives are not mere
aggregates, and individuals are not merely parts of collectives, but just as collectives cannot be
understood without a theory of the individual, the individual cannot be understood without a
theory of the collective. This is the familiar gemeinschaftlgesellschaft dichotomy.
Another example is sociologist Nicholas Luhmann's theory of autopoesis, which posits
how social systems reproduce themselves without direct reference to individual decision
making. See generally Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idea of a Legal Unconscious, 13 CARDOZO L.

REV. 1473 (1992).
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proposition that a theory of human nature should make intuitive
sense is very appealing.
Others, more generally, insist that the purpose of a theory is to
provide an explanation of a phenomenon understood as a causal
mechanism.i'^' Friedmanian "as if" instrumentalism "not only refuses
to offer any causal mechanism linking business behavior to the
maximization of returns; it positively rules out the possibility of such
an explanation."^^' SpecificaUy, Friedman's critics charge him with
impUcitly accepting the "symmetry" thesis, which has long smce
been disproved. The notion that explanation is "prediction written
backwards" is equivalent to the assertion that "there is a perfect,
logical symmetry between the nature of explanation and the nature
of prediction ...This methodology has been shown to rely
entirely on deduction (and, of course, abduction);
The universal laws that are involved in explanations are not
derived by inductive generalization from individual instances;
they are merely hypotheses, inspired conjectures if you like,
that may be tested by using them to make predictions about
particular events but which are not themselves reducible to
observations about events.'^'

Friedman's abandonment of Verstehen is particularly
remarkable given that Friedrich von Hayek had advocated it as
necessarily flowing from the very nature of neoclassical price theory.
Price theory is a subset of that branch of social science that seeks to
understand a collective or a whole in terms of its individual terms. In
this case, the market is explained in terms of the aggregate behavior
of economic subjects.
Hayek contrasted "methodolog^l
individualism" with "methodological collectivism."
The
preference for methodological individuahsm may denve as much
from phUosophical as scientific concerns. As its name suggests, this
methodology reflects the highly individuaUstic conception of human
nature epitomized by Margaret Thatcher's famous assertion that
there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families.
Or, in Lawson's words:
[Wlhen one studies human behavior, one always studies the
behavior of individual humans. There is simply nothing else to
study: "[Tjhere are no such things as ends of or actions by

166 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 98.
167 Id. at 91.
168 Id. at 5.

170 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 541 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF
^^^ni See^Jon Margolis, Market Versus Family Values: GOP Debate Cut to Core About
Conservatism's Vision, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24,1996, § 2, at 7.
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'groups,' 'collectives,' or 'States,' which do not take place as
actions by various specific individuals." When we speak of the
action of a group, as we often do, we speak metaphorically."^

If we are to understand collectives only as aggregates of individuals,
then "on one version of the principle of methodological
individualism, the social scientist is to 'continue searching for
explanations of a social phenomenon tmtil he has reduced it to
psychological terms.It is ironic, therefore, that Friedman and
Posner could take a theory rooted in a radical individualistic
philosophy and a desire to understand human psychology and
purport to remove individual psychology from it.
5.

Demonstrably False Assumptions

Perhaps the most telling example of how far Friedman's
concept of scientific theory and explanation differs from the norm is
his "constructed" theory of leaf density, which he believes is "an
analogue of many hypotheses in the social sciences.""" Friedman
asks, how can one accoimt for the fact that trees have more leaves on
the south (the sunnier side) than the north? He writes:
I suggest the hypothesis that the leaves are positioned as if each
leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it
receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the
physical laws determining the amount of sunlight that would be
received in various positions and could move rapidly or
instantaneously from any one position to any other desired and
unoccupied position."^

He asks the supposedly rhetorical question: "Is the hypothesis
rendered unacceptable or invalid because, so far as we know, leaves
do not 'deliberate' or consciously 'seek,' have not been to school and
learned the relevant law of science or the mathematics required to
calculate the 'optimum' position, and cannot move from position to
position?""® He declares that the hypothesis is not rendered
unacceptable because "the contradictions ... are not within the 'class
of phenomena the hypothesis is designed to explain'; the hypothesis

172 Lawson, supra note 89, at 59 (quoting 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY,
AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 2 (1962)). I believe that, given
Lawson's unexamined claim that there is nothing else to study other than individuals, Lawson
protests too much when he asserts that methodological individualism "most emphatically is
not a metaphysical claim about human autonomy, a psychological claim about the formation
of preferences, or a normative celebration of separateness." Id.
173 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 541 (quoting J.W.N. Watkins, Ideal Types and Historical
Explanation, 3 BRIT. J. PHIL SCI. 29 (1952)).
174 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 19.
175 Id.
176 /d. at20.
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does not assert that leaves do these things but only that their density
is the same as i/they did.""'
Despite Friedman's unsupported assertions to the contrary, I
believe most scientists would agree that these contradictions do
indeed make the constructed hypothesis unacceptable, which is why
it has not been adopted by botanists. I find it patently incredible that
any botanist would be satisfied, as Friedman is, with the statement
that trees look "as if' their leaves calculated and moved when our
everyday experience indicates that individual leaves are neither
sentient nor mobile. Rather, I would expect botanists to be
interested in learning precisely what process causes leaves to become
so clustered.
. . ,
More important, Friedman's "explanation" is m fact no
explanation at all. He observes that leaf density is greater on the
sunny side of trees. He asserts that we can predict this behavior if we
assume that this is so because leaves move to the sunny side of trees.
Not only is this patently false, but the only thing that it predicts is the
phenomenon already observed—that leaf density is greater on the
sunny side of trees. In other words, this is not a theory that predicts
a previously unobserved phenomenon, but merely a patently false ad
hoc, and post hoc, explanation.
Friedman's answer might be, in effect, "who cares" whether or
not the assumption (in this case of calculation) is literally true or not,
so long as the theory predicts the movement of billiard balls, leaf
density, and the behavior of businesses. Once again, this response
reflects Friedman's extraordinarily narrow view of scientific
explanation. Perhaps this seems more obvious from the viewpoint of
the turn of the millennium, when we are surrounded by wmputers
and discussions of the possibility of creating artificial intelligence are
commonplace. Perhaps Friedman and Posner personally do not care
about how economic actors "in fact" make decisions and act, so long
as they can predict aggregate market behavior with reasonable
accuracy. (Even though, as I discuss in Economic Rationality,"^
behavioral economists claim that evidence shows that the
assumption of economic rationality is a relatively poor predictor of
market behavior.)"' Perhaps there are stUl some radical behaviorists

177

Id.

178 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
179 As Brian Leiter has said:
•
•
cPhilosophers, too, have recently launched a devastating attack on the scientitic
and cognitive credentials of economics, starting from the observation that
"[elconomic theory is one of the more dismal empirical failures in the history of
science " This is widely conceded about the laughably unsuccessful predictions
of macroeconomics, but it is only somewhat less true of microeconomics, which
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who only study "objective" behavior and claim not to care about (or
even to suspect the existence of) subjective experience.^®" I doubt it.
For example, to return to Friedman's leaf example, a more
"realistic" hypothesis might be that a greater percentage of the
leaves on the shady side of the tree wither and die, and a greater
percentage of the leaves on the sunny side of the tree flourish; this
would explain the phenomenon observed (relative leaf density)
equally well with the advantage not only of being true, but also of
suggesting other potential theories or "predictions" to test. That is,
it suggests that leaves need a certain amount of light to live (a theory
that one can attempt to falsify by placing part of a tree in total
darkness and observing what happens), which would in turn lead to
other theories about trees and other plants—such as the theory that,
unlike we animals who obtain the energy necessary for survival from
eating other animals or plants, plants that have leaves are able to
obtain energy directly from sunlight (i.e., through photosynthesis).
It should not be surprising that Simon, one of the most
vociferous critics of Friedman's "unreality principle," was not only
the father of behavioral economics, but also a theorist of artificial
intelligence.^®' Both behavioral economics and artificial intelligence
theory are concerned with how people actually do think and make
decisions, and can never be satisfied with assertions that people act
as if they thought a certain way. In Simon's terminology, he is
concerned with defining procedural rationality (the process of
thought), whereas Friedman only concerns himself with substantive
rationality (the result of the process).'®^ The substantive approach
seems to reflect a remarkable lack of curiosity about human nature
and subjective experience.
II.

POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY
A.

Posner's Account

Although Posner's stated methodology is based on Friedman's,
he does differ in theory by being more extreme; he also violates his
own stated precepts in practice. In his reply to JST, Posner repeats
"has made no advances in the management of economic processes since its
current formalism was first elaborated in the nineteenth century."
Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE PATH OF THE L/UVAND
ITS INFLUENCE, 285, 305 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (citations omitted). Economics is
"better, perhaps, than astrology, but not much more predictively successful than common
sense psychology." Id. at 304.
180 See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 476-80, for a brief description of early behaviorism, which
adopted something close to this strict standard.
181 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFIQAL (1969).
182 See SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 425-26.
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Friedman's dichotomy between the descriptive accuracy and
predictive power of a potential theory.^®' He declares that behavioral
economics is flawed precisely because it is too empirical and is
"defined by its subject rather than its method.'"^ "Describing,
specifying, and classifying the empirical failures of a theory is a valid
and important scholarly activity. But it is not an alternative
theory.
Regardless of whether one accepts Posner's characterization of
JST's article specially, or of behavioral economics in general, so far,
his statements are not that surprising. As already discussed,'®* all
theory requires abstraction, and the process of abstraction, by
necessity, suppresses many concrete features of specific phenomena.
In this sense, the descriptive activities Posner damns with faint praise
by labeling them "valid and important scholarly activities" are,
therefore, by definition not theorization, because they do not
abstract from reality. What Posner underplays, however, is that
describing, specifying, and classifying empirical inconsistencies are
the primary tools in the process of development, refinement, and
testing of a hypothesis known as falsification—the methodology that
Posner claims to champion. He also ignores the fact that, as
discussed above, observation and description (and, therefore,
specification and classification) are themselves forms of abstractions.
According to Posner, "If a theory cannot be falsified, neither it
nor its predictions can be validated, for everything that happens is by
definition consistent with the theory.'"®' So far, so good. He
continues:
JST's theory seems perilously close to the abyss of
nonfalsifiability; perhaps it has fallen in. When people act
rationally, JST do not treat this as contradicting the assumption
of bounded willpower. When people resist temptations, thus
demonstrating strength of will, this is not treated as
contradicting the assumption of bounded willpower. And when
they act selfishly, this is not deemed a contradiction of the
assumption of bounded self-interest.... So the question arises,
what if any observation would falsify JST's theory?'®®
183 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559 ("[I]n theory-making,
descriptive accuracy is purchased at a price, the price being loss of predictive power.").
181 Id.
185 Id. at 1560.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 86-104.
187 Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1560.
188 Id. As stated before, my goal is to criticize Posner, not to defend JST. Nevertheless, I
will once again point out that Posner is (clearly) mischaracterizing JST's position. They are
not arguing that people are never economically "rational" in the classical sense, nor that they,
on the contrary, are always weak of will, altruistic, or whatever. Rather, I believe that they are
saying that human nature is neither wholly divine nor wholly bestial. Humans do not act
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Nevertheless, despite his casting stones at JST, Posner can be
charged with committing precisely the same sin. In this final Part, I
introduce the classic account of fdsification as developed by Popper
and his school. I then contrast Popperian falsification with Posner's
methodology in theory and in practice. As has been argued by
others before me, although Posner calls for an objective, fact-based
analysis of legal issues, he in fact rarely, if ever, engages in empirical
investigation.^'*' In Economic Rationality I show that many of
Posner's claimed predictions of unobserved behavior are, in fact, ad
hoc explanations of previously observed behavior.^'" In this Article,
I further show that when Posner does hazard predictions, he merely
uses the vocabulary of falsification while replacing it with the much
easier, but less rehable, method of verification. I partially redeem
Posner by suggesting that one can interpret him as implicitly
adopting the first step (but only the first one) of the methodology
that Popper's student Imre Lakatos called "sophisticated"
falsification. This is abduction—the telling of just so stories.
Nevertheless, although every journey starts with the first step,
Posner remains far from his goal of estabhshing an appropriate
methodology for legal analysis.
B.

Fosnerian Methodology v. Popperian Falsification

This, O my Best Beloved, is a story—a new and a
wonderful story—a story quite different from the other
stories...

Friedman and, therefore, Posner claim to be adherents of
falsification. The most developed theory that states that scientific
methodology should be limited to falsification is that developed by
Karl Popper and his school.''^
purely economically rationally, but neither do they act purely irrationally. But it does not
follow from this, as Posner suggests, that this means that man is totally unpredictable. JST are
arguing that preliminary studies indicate that people have a tendency to deviate from the
theoretical norm of economic rationality in fairly predictable ways in certain identifiable
circumstances and that the rationality postulate needs to be modified with an auxiliary to
account for these apparent anomalies.
189 See Luban, supra note 28, at 1005. Luban describes Posner as arguing that "[d]ecisions
at law, judicial or otherwise, must be based on a realistic, empirically informed, unsentimental,
preferably quantitative comparison of costs and benefits...." Id. However, later Luban
argues that although economics, one of the three keys to Posner's legal theories, is "a
quantitative and empirical scientific discipline[,]" Posner's own model "creates too many
uncertainties ... when Posner tries to move from the qualitative to the quantitative, from the
imprecise to the precise." Id. at 1024.
190 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
191 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 199.
192 There are other schools of philosophy of science. Willard Van Orman Quine, for
example, rejects Popperian falsification as ad hoc and has developed a coherence theory that
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At this point, I should at least note in passing that, although it is
commonplace among lawyers and other lay people to follow Popper
and identify scientific reasoning with falsification,'^' there is a good
deal of disagreement among philosophers of science and practicing
scientists whether this is the case, either in theory or practice.
Indeed, one can argue that Popperian falsification is obsolete, n^vrng
been superseded by more recent theories of saentific
methodology."" What methods scientists actually follow in practice
is another question."' It is yet another question entirely whether
moral and legal questions can or should be decided by "scientific'
methods.
, ^
. u
Although one need not go as far as Paul Feyerabend, who
supposedly asserted that actual scientific practice is "anythmg
goes,""" it is probably true that even the most ardent believer m
falsification must, as a practical matter, combhie a number of
different methodologies as well as "gut feeling" in scientific
investigation."' W.V.O. Quine goes further in concludmg that
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supports induction. See W.V. QuiNE & J.S. ULLIAN,
WEB OF Belief 65, 89-91 (2d ed
1978") Popper wrote his Logik der Forschung in 1934 (published in English as The Logic f
Scientific Discovery in 1959), and his theory has arguably been largely superseded m
philosophic circles by more recent work. For an introduction to modern philosophy of science
Lee piper, see David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding,
"Tw' S
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L RE .
(2000). Nevertheless, because Posner claims to adopt the methodology of falsification, I shall
limit myself to the theory of Popper and his school.
.
^
«.»
n
193 Most famously, the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), wrote as though Popperian falsificanon was
virtually universally accepted among scientists and philosophers of science. See id. at 592 95.
194 Two recent commentators have suggested that the Daubert decision reflects a surprising
ignorance of the last forty years of scholarship in this area,
Caudll & Redding wpra no e
192- John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST. MARY S L.J. 1 (1996).
195 For an interesting account of how one of the most famous textbook examples of the
experimental method at work in fact deviated far from the ideal of "falsification see Oliver
Morton, Science in the Dark, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1999, at A18 (discussing theories that
purport to explain solar eclipses).
.
.
, • „
„,oc a
196 Although Paul Feyerabend has occasionally used this expression, he claims that it was
ioke. "Anything goes" is a reductio ad absurdum of his actual position that science, hke any
other scholarly endeavor, should not and cannot commit itself to any specific inethod. See
PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 186 (1978). As I have Stated elsewhere:
Feyerabend means to suggest that different methods may be more or less
adequate for different tasks and that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
define ahead of time what method is best suited to the task at hand.... 11 Jo
presume that one knows ahead of time which method will turn out to be the
most adequate is to presuppose that one knows the very answM one is ^^efang
Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 152 n.LOL; ice also PAUL KYERABEND, AGAWST
METHOD (1975); PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO REASON (1987). In the
o
Richard Rorty, "[Tlhe whole idea of 'being scientific' and of choosing tetween
meth^ is
confused." RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 195 (1986). Although
Feyerabend started as a student of Popper, he became one of his most vociferous cntics.
197 As Gregory Crespi suggests:
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falsification is incoherent as a methodology. As soon as one admits
that one must develop auxiliary explanations to explain why
empirical observation deviates from the hypothesis (as it must
always do), then one is, in fact, admitting that one is not engaging in
falsification. Consequently, despite their logical flaws, abduction and
verification may be the only methods available in our imperfect
world.^'® The theory of sophisticated falsification developed by
Lakatos and championed by Blaug is an attempt to defend the
practice of falsification against Quine's charge of ad hoceryl^
This debate, although extremely interesting, will not be resolved
in this Article. Posner and Friedman have already taken sides with
the falsifiers so I will in the next section limit myself to an internal
criticism from within the falsification school. As shall be evident
from the last section of this Article, whatever methodology is
appropriate for science, I neither believe that law is or can be a
science, nor that scientific methodology is the only or the best
methodology for the study of law.^°°
1.

The Problem of Induction

Proponents of falsification are reacting to the logical problem of
induction. This problem is so familiar as to border on the banal. It is
worth revisiting, however, because although it is easy enough to
distinguish falsification and verification in theory, scientists
frequently are unable to resist the temptation to confuse them in
practice, because verification is so much easier to apply than

It is no secret that models which satisfy strict faisifiability criteria are the
exception rather than the rule, certainly in economics and perhaps even in the
physical sciences. Faisifiability is a very severe standard and should be regarded
as an aspirational ideal rather than a description of current scientific practice.
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting
the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 239
(1991) (citations omitted).
198 See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 43 (2d ed.
1961).
199 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 168. Although I find Lakatos and Blaug's
account of how research programs degenerate quite convincing, I find their assertion about
the logical necessity of movement from a degenerate research program to a new and untested
"progressive" research program to be less than persuasive. Feyerabend argues that, as a
historical matter, scientists have frequently rejected old research programs for new ones that
do not meet Lakatos's criterion that the latter have excess empirical content over the former.
See Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialists, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 127, at 197, 220. Nevertheless, the Lakatos-Blaug account is the
best defense of falsification as a practice that I have seen.
200 Of course, even radical falsifier Popper does not disdain other forms of reasoning. He is
merely trying to "distinguish sharply between objective science on the one hand, and 'our
knowledge' on the other." POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 98.
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falsification.^"^ In this section I show that this is an error that Posner
routinely makes.
Induction is the derivation of universal rules from specific
examples.^® This is, of course, an extremely common mental
process. It characterizes not only the eommon-law case method but
also much of what is known as "common sense." Unfortunately, in
contrast to deduction (the derivation of speeific eases from universal
rules),^"^ one cannot absolutely prove, as a logical matter, the truth of
the hypothesis derived from induction.
Through induction, when one observes one thousand white
swans and not a single black one, one might conclude that all swans
are white and predict that all additional swans one might observe in
the future will also be white. Nevertheless, no matter how many
additional white swans one observes, this does not logically rule out
the possibility that there might be some blaek swans out there hiding
in the shadows. Indeed, it turns out that there is a species of black
swans indigenous to (where else?) Australia. In other words,
"verification"—defined as the attempt to prove the truth of a
hypothesis by searching for observations that are consistent with the
predictions drawn from one's hypothesis—is not a reliable
methodology.
Popper famously claimed to have "solved" the problem of
induction.^"" Induction can be used negatively, not positively. That
is, while no number of consistent observations can prove a
hypothesis, even one inconsistent observation can theoretically
201 This is an accusation that Blaug makes against his fellow economists. See, e.g., BLAUG,
supra note 18, at 226 ("Despite continued appeal to the methodological norms of
falsificationism, the whole of Becker's writings are positively infected by the easier option of
verificationism
"). However, Blaug notes that Friedman believes that "verification of the
postulates or assumptions of economic theory is both unnecessary and misleading
" Id. at
110. Nonetheless, "[t]he prevailing methodological mood is not only highly protective of
received economic theory, it is also ultrapermissible within the limits of the 'rules of the
game'
Modern economists frequently preach falsificationism,... but they rarely practice
it; their working philosophy of science is aptly described as 'innocuous falsificationism.'" Id. at
110-11 (citation omitted).
202 To use Charles Sanders Peirce's example of an inductive syllogism:
Case.— These beans are from this bag.
Result.— These beans are white.
.-.Rule.- All the beans from this bag are white.
2 CHARI-ES S. PEIRCE, Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 373 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960) [hereinafter
COLLECTED PAPERS]; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 179-80.
203 Peirce's example of a deductive syllogism is:
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.— These beans are from this bag.
.-.Result.— These beans are white.
2 PEIRCE, supra note 202, at 374; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 179-80.
204 See POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 8-9; see also Schroeder,
Abduction, supra note 33, at 162.
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disprove a hypothesis. (I say "theoretically" because I shall leave the

pragmatic problems of actually applying falsification as a
methodology and the resulting theory of sophisticated falsification to
a subsequent section.) Consequently, Popper proposes that the only
true scientific methodology is "falsification"—defined as the attempt
to disprove a hypothesis through a search for observations that are
inconsistent with predictions drawn from the hypothesis.
Note that falsification, like verification, is a form of inductive
reasoning. It can, therefore, never be used to prove directly the
objective truth of a hypothesis. Popper, nevertheless, argued that
falsification can be used to bring science closer to objective truth.^"'
By repeated apphcation of the methodology of falsification,
scientists can weed out false theories. Eventually, through a process
of elimination or "apagogic" reasoning, we wiU arrive at the "truth"
as the only theory left. The rub is that the problem of mduction
informs us that we can never know for sure when we have arrived at
a true theory. No matter how many times we have failed to observe
data inconsistent with our hypothesis, there is always the logical
possibility that the next observation will falsify our hypothesis. It is
reasonable for scientists to tentatively accept a hypothesis that has
not heretofore withstood repeated attempts to falsify it.
Nevertheless, all such acceptances are merely contingent. To claim
scientific status, a hypothesis must always remain fallible and
corrigible.^"®
2.

Assumptions

Although Posner claims to be engaging in scientific reasoning
he, in fact, confuses the first step in scientific reasoningabduction—with the later steps of induction and deduction—and
then further confuses falsification with verification. Let us now
consider the process of forming hypotheses so that we can contrast it
with the process of proving or demonstrating them.
As I discussed in the previous Part,^"' Friedman and Posner
state that the validity of the "assumptions" underlying a hypothesis is
205 Popper has a very sophisticated—indeed postmodern—conception of "objective truth.
He regards truth as a humanly created, intersubjective consensus that is reached through t e
application of an agreed upon methodology, as opposed to correspondence mth whatever
reality exists "out there." Nevertheless, Popper believed (or hoped) that through the scientific
methodology of falsification, our objective knowledge might eventually approach external

reality. 5eein)ra text accompanying notes 209-27.

J

As Popper reminds us, if one does not criticize oneself, one's rivals will be happy to do
so. See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 16. According to Mansfield,
Popper de-emphasized the fact that finding facts consistent with a theory does provide some
confirmation (but not certainty) of a hypothesis's truth and emphasized falsification "in order
to encourage a skeptical attitude toward hypotheses." Mansfield, supra note 194, at 11.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45,132-57.
206
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irrelevant to the validity of the hypothesis. Popper, in contrast,
insists that the first step in any scientific methodology is hypothesis
formation—a process that necessarily comprises the development of
a set of assumptions. Popper readily admitted that there was an
inevitably ad hoc, subjective, "irrational," and (he thought)
unscientific aspect to this necessary starting moment—there is no
way logically to determine where to start.^°® Althou^ one's starting
hypotheses usually originate in empirical observation, there is no
way objectively to choose what facts to start from—observation
requires a viewpoint and a viewpoint is always subjective.^"'
Popper comes to the surprising conclusion that in some sense
one's initial working assumptions are ultimately "irrelevant" to
scientific process.^'" But this is not, as Friedman and Posner suggest,
because a valid theory does not require valid assumptions (the Ftwist). Rather, it is because it is the assumptions themselves that are
the very subject of falsification. In other words. Popper believes that
initial assumptions are only irrelevant in the sense that the scientific
process of falsification should eventually winnow out all bad
assumptions so that the scientific community would approach
consensus as to what the appropriate assumptions should be.^"
As I have briefly discussed, Posner identified three "worlds" of
truth. First there is the first world of objective reality that exists

208 See POPPER, SCIENI IFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31. Popper states: "The initial
stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical
analysis nor to be susceptible of it." Id. Consequently, every scientific idea contains an
"irrational element" or "creative intuition" that is a matter of "psychology." Id. at 32. Peirce,
of course, would disagree: he thought that an understanding of abduction was necessary for an
understanding of science. Part of this disagreement springs from different uses of the word
"rational." Popper hmits the term "rationality" to logical necessity.
209 As indicated by the title of his essay The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of
Knowledge, in POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 341, Popper used the
metaphor of the searchlight to describe his theory of science as an active searching starting
from a specific viewpoint, and contrasts it with the more common, but naive, "bucket theory,"
which sees the mind as a passive receptacle of facts. He states, "In science it is observation
rather than perception which plays the decisive part. An observation is a perception, but one
which is planned and prepared
An observation is always preceded by a particular interest,
a question, or a problenMn short, by something theoretical." Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
Consequently, Popper concludes that "[t]he initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a
theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it." POPPER,
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31. The origins of scientific theories contain an
"irrational element" or "creative intuition" and are matters of "psychology." Id. at 31-32.
210 He states that "[t]he question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man... is
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge." POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY,
supra note 33, at 31.
211 Popper says that the origins of a scientific theory are irrelevant, because once
formulated, the theory is then "submitted... to logical examination." Id. at 31. The scientist
engages in "subsequent tests" that will determine whether "the inspiration may be discovered
to be a discovery, or become known to be knowledge." Id.
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external to human thought.^^^ Popper agreed with theorists as
diverse as Kant, Peirce, and Lacan that we humans have no direct
access to this "thing-in-itself' because our knowledge is always
mediated by our thoughts and perceptions. He called our subjective
experience of reality the second world.^" Nevertheless, Popper did
not think that each of us is condemned to the ignorance of our
individual, idiosyncratic second worlds. Rather, he believed that, by
adopting an appropriate methodology, a community could come to
an intersubjective consensus, which he called the third world.^"
Popper sought to identify a logical methodology distinguishable
from and more reliable than "common sense" that could lead to the
favored consensus of science.
Popper sometimes suggested that the third world—the
consensus reached by science—could eventually approach a true
understanding of the first, or object, world.^" By proper apphcation
of the scientific method of falsification the community of scientists
could weed out the bad hypotheses and arrive at a consensus as to
which remaining hypotheses seemed promising for future testing.^^®
In Popper's terminology, these consensus theses were "objective,"
but only in the sense of being reached by intersubjective

212 See POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 106 ("[W]e may distinguish
the following three words or universes: first, the world of physical objects or of physical
states
").
213 In Popper's words, this is "the world of states of consciousness, or mental states, or
perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act." Id.
214 This is "the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic
thoughts and of works of art." Id.
215 Although Popper argued that the intersubjective third world did not have direct access
to the objective first world, he also thought that the subjective second world formed an
indirect link between them. See id. at 155-56. Note that although Popper insists on
characterizing his third world as "objective," see id. at 108-09, he is using the word in the sense
that I have called "Community Objectivity," or intersubjective consensus. See Schroeder,
Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 17-28. Intersubjective consensus is objective only in the
sense that it is independent of the idiosyncratic subjectivity of any specific member of the
community who creates the consensus, not in the sense that it relates to direct access to the
external "object" world. In this sense, scientific knowledge is subjectless, as indicated by the
title of Popper's essay Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject. See POPPER, OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 106.
216 Although Popper recognized the "irrational" moment of theory creation, he argued that
this was irrelevant because the methodology of falsification would weed out any purely
idiosyncratic theory, leaving only those that are "objective" in the sense of being the subject of
intersubjective consensus. See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31; Karl R.
Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 127, at 51,57; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 163-64.
Note that, from a Popperian standpoint, scientific theories are '"value free' or
aperspectival... in the sense that they are not dependent on the idiosyncratically held
opinions or the viewpoint of any one member of the community but are chosen by, and shared
within, the community." Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 20.
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agreement.'" We have no direct way of knowing whether a thesis is
"objectively" true in the sense of being absolutely and universally
true—because we do not have access to the mind of God. In
Kantian terms, as phenomenal creatures we cannot know the
noumenon (the thing-in-itself).
Popper describes his notion of science as a search for
"verisimilitude" rather than "truth."'^® This does not imply,
however, that Popper is indifferent to the truth claims of theory in
the way that Friedman and Posner are. Rather, Popper's distinction
rests on a very exalted definition of truth, coupled with a modest
assessment of human limitations. By "truth" Popper means the set
of all true statements"—that is, perfect knowledge of the object
world with absolutely no omissions—which, he admits, is an
"unattainable target set.'"'® Only God Himself would be capable of
such absolute knowledge. Consequently, Popper seeks a clearer
and a more realistic aim than the search for the truth
understood
in this universal sense. The goal of verisimilitude is a corollary to the
Popperian principle that scientific hypotheses, hke all human
knowledge, are always fallible and corrigible and, therefore, always
"false" to some degree. Consequently, he accepts the fact that
"theories retain their interest even if we have reason to believe that
they are false.""' But, once again, this is not, as Friedman and
Posner argue, because the only test of theory is prediction. Instead,
Popper thinks that a good theory is an "approximation""' of the
truth, and that the apphcation of scientific methodology can make
theories into more and more accurate approximations:
I intend to show that while we can never have sufficiently good
arguments in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have
actually reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably
good arguments for claiming that we may have made progress
towards the truth; that is, that the theory E is preferable to its
predecessor T„ at least in the light of all known rational
arguments.
Moreover, we can explain the method of science, and
much of the history of science, as the rational procedure for
getting nearer to the truth.'"
217 See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 44; Schroeder, Subject: Object,
supra note 29, at 17-24.
218 POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 57.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 He states, "Newton never believed that his theory was really the last word, and Einstein
never believed that his theory was more than a good approximation to the true theoiy^he
unified field theory which he searched for —" Id.
223 Id. at 57-58 (emphases added).
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Consequently, as Luban has suggested,Posner's selfproclaimed pragmatism with its, at best, agnostic view toward the
truth of theories seems at odds with his stated allegiance to the
scientific methodology of falsification, which sees truth as the
asymptote that scientific theory as verisimilitude approaches, but
never reaches.
Once again, I am not arguing that the Popperian notion of
science as falsification is itself unproblematic. One nagging problem
with Popper's confidence that science can weed out bad initial
assmnptions (making them "irrelevant") should be obvious.
Because falsification can only work negatively and all scientific
theories remain fallible and corrigible, we can never know when or if
all bad assumptions have been eliminated. Although Popper hoped
that the third world of scientific, intersubjective consensus could
approach correspondence with the first world of "objective" reality,
he understood "that it is not possible to move from a logical
conclusion to a statement about the real [i.e., first] world."'^^ In
other words, even though Popper thought that falsification "would
continue the progress of knowledge," the conclusion "that there was
any progress at all must finally be a matter of faith."^^®
Consequently, there would seem to be considerable advantages
if we could determine somehow what type of assumptions are more
or less likely to prove fruitful before embarking on the arduous and
unending process of falsification. It might be possible through the
study of human thought and behavior to identify systematic
prejudices that color our thought processes, which might make us
suspicious of certain types of hypotheses and favorably disposed
toward others.
3. Abduction
Charles Sanders Peirce, the great philosopher of science and
cofounder of pragmatism, tried to give greater rigor to our
understanding of the process of determining which assumptions are
likely to prove fruitful for inquiry. Following Aristotle, he called this
process "abduction" or "retroduction."^^^ In contrast to Popper, who
only includes deduction and induction in his definition of logic,
Peirce insisted that abduction is "a form of logic equal to the other

224 See Luban, supra note 28, at 1005.
225 Mansfield, supra note 194, at 11.
226 Id. at 12.
227 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Lessons from the History of Science, in COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 202, at 28; see also RICHARD TURSMAN, PEIRCE'S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY 13 (1987); Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 115-17.
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forms and absolutely crucial to the growth of knowledge.In
other words, to a Peircean, initial assumptions are neither irrelevant
nor can they be dismissed as unreal, but are at the heart of scientific
methodology.
Abduction is a retroactive attempt to account for a past
observation. It is post hoc explanation. Abduction may be
described as follows: I observe a surprising thing (i.e., something that
is different from my expectations, or an empirical datum that seems
anomalous to the result predicted through application of my hard
core theory). I then try to use my imagination to formulate an
account that would explain the surprising thing.^^' By explanation,
Peirce means: Fact X seems surprising, but if such and such were
true, then the fact of X would no longer be surprising, but would
seem to be a matter of course.^^°
Peirce describes the difference between the three forms of logic
as follows: "Deduction proves that something must be [i.e.,
necessity]; Induction shows that something actually is operative [i.e.,
actuality]; Abduction merely suggests that something may be [i.e.,
possibility].As Nancy Harrowits explains, "Abduction is a theory
developed to explain a pre-existing fact."^^^
In normal English, abduction is intelligent guessing."^
One of Peirce's important points, however, is that abduction
alone is merely the generation of potential hypotheses, not a form of
scientific proof or even demonstration.^^" In my example, the fact
that X exists standing alone does not prove or even give us reason to
228 Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 119; see also TURSMAN, supra note 227, at 81;
Paul Weiss, Charles S. Peirce, Philosopher, in PERSPECTIVES ON PEIRCE: CRITICAL ESSAYS
ON CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 120,125 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1965).
229 See 2 PEIRCE, supra note 202, at 374; Thomas A. Sebeok, One, Two, Three Spells
UBERTY, in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 1,8 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A.
Sebeok eds., 1983) [hereinafter THE SIGN OF THREE]; Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at
179-81; see also NORWOOD R. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OFSCIENCE 85 (1958).
230 See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 151 (Justus Buchler
ed., 1985); see also Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves and Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three
Types of Abduction, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 229, at 198, 203-04; Schroeder,
Abduction, supra note 33, at 179 n.216.
231 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Three Types of Reasoning, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note
202, at 106.
232 Nancy Harrowits, The Body of the Detective Model Charles S. Peirce and Edgar Allan
Poe, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 229, at 182.
Peirce's example of an inductive syllogism is:
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white.
Result.—These beans are white.
.-.Case.-These beans are from this bag.
2 PHlRCE, supra note 202, at 374.
233 As I have called it elsewhere. See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 180.
234 See id. at 183-84.
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think that such and such is in fact true. Abduction is the spinning of
a good yam. It is the telling of just so stories. An abduction that
seems plausible, given what other things we know or believe about
the world, does, however, constitute a reason for us to further
investigate whether such and such is true. To quote Umberto Eco, a
theorist of abduction, we need a way of "deciding as to whether the
possible universe outlined by our first-level abductions is the same as
the universe of our experience.
Elsewhere, I have suggested that theorists of abduction have
offered at least three general ways of moving from abduction to
proof. The first would be some form of "logical" or "reasoned"
method."^ As I have already discussed, the Popperian tradition says
that we can never, in fact, verify whether or not the new hypothesis
is true, but we can develop a research program in an attempt to
falsify the new hypothesis. That does not mean that we may not
have "good reasons" to either logically or intuitively choose one
abducted hypothesis over the other. Obviously, a hypothesis that is
consistent with other facts and theories that the scientist already
accepts has a competitive advantage over others. For example, even
though I enjoy the X-Files, I would not favor an abducted hypothesis
suggesting that the reason why so many people behave in ways that
seem economically irrational is that they have been abducted by
aliens.
This is why we are not tempted to try to test the hypotheses
presented in Kipling's Just So Stories: even though they would
explain certain surprising facts if they were true. Given what we
know about the world, they are simply not plausible explanations.
Indeed, their very absurdity labels them as fantasy and makes them
amusing. On the other hand, some brilliant abductions have been
accepted by the scientific community despite the fact that they
initi^ly seemed to have been widely diverse from accepted
knowledge (think, for example of the principles of quantmn
mechanics).
A second possible way of "proving" a hypothesis is through
some "nonscientific," "nonlogical," or "irrational" method such as
by reference to taste, aesthetics, morality, politics, or faith."' By
definition, theories of "science" (as opposed to theology or

235 Eco, supra note 230, at 207.
236 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 183.
237 See id. Note, I am not using the word "irrationality" in the negative sense of being
insane, nor do I mean to imply that irrationality is necessarily somehow inferior to rationality.
Many very sophisticated thinkers believe that, ultimately, religious faith is the only sure path
to truth.
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philosophies of morality or aesthetics) have little to say about such
methods.
A third approach, one that is occasionally adopted by Peirce
and Hegel, may be called a philosophical theory of
"metaabduction."^^® This posits that there might be reason to believe
that man has some inherent ability to make good abductions (guess
correctly) about the object world.^^' A full discussion of Peirce's
theory (which is remarkably similars to Hegel's) is beyond the scope
of this Article. But, to oversimplify, it is based on the proposition
that if we can assume that the human mind participates in universal
reality, then there might also be reason to suppose that studying
human consciousness might give us knowledge of the universe as
well. In Tursman's words:
If nature and thought are parts of the same system, then it may
well be the case that whatever constraints apply to the system of
thought apply as well to the system of nature. Or, to put it
another way, our main goal is to discover whatever constraints
obtain on the one system of thought and nature, and if the only
way we can observe these constraints on the entire system is by
observing the constraints on thought, then that hypothesis is
worth pursuing.^'"'
As described by Eco, metaabduction requires that one have "the
courage of challenging without further tests the basic fallibilism that
governs human knowledge."^"'
Peirce and Hegel suggest that metaabduction could only work
at the highest level of abstraction—they would never suggest that we
can rely on our abductions about most scientific theories, let alone
everyday decisions.^"^
Most actual abductions have aU the
independent reliability of just so stories. Consequently, some form
of pragmatic reasoning is always a necessary complement to
dialectical reasoning.
As we shall see, Posner, however, merely engages in this first
step of abduction, but never proposes a research program. As
discussed earlier, falsification consists of speculating about what as
yet unobserved phenomena would be inconsistent with one's
hypothesis, and then attempting through controlled observation to
238 Eco coined "the term 'meta-abduction' to describe the process of moving from a 'firstlevel' abductive hypothesis to the conclusion that the hypothesis is true" (that is, "true" in the
sense of matching our experience of the world). Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 183
n.234; see also Eco, supra note 230, at 207.
239 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 184.
240 TURSMAN, supra note 227, at 115.
241 Eco, supra note 230, at 220.
242 See 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution, in COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 202, at 70-71; Eco, supra note 230, at 218; Schroeder, Abduction, supra
note 33, at 185.
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identify the empirical existence of such phenomena. This is the
opposite of the methodology that Posner in fact adopts—
verification—in which one speculates as to what as-yet unobserved
phenomena would be consistent with the hypothesis and then
hvmting for such verifying phenomena.
4. Sophisticated Falsification
Imre Lakatos reworked Popper's methodology to develop what
I will call "sophisticated" falsification. The problem with the simple
statement of falsification given above—that a hypothesis is falsified if
scientists observe data inconsistent with the predictions of the
hypothesis—should be obvious. No actual hypothesis could ever
withstand such strict scrutiny in the messy empirical world. We can
always expect to observe some data that at least seems at first blush
inconsistent with any theory. Friedman and Posner might be trying
to capture this idea in their odd assertion that the assumptions
underlying theories are "unrealistic" in the sense of simplified and
abstract.
Popper recognizes this problem in part when he insists that
falsification requires more than the mere observation of
inconsistencies. Rather, these inconsistencies must be consistently
observed in reproducible, controlled observations. This only partly
solves Popper's problems.
As Friedman correctly suggests,^"^ insofar as all theories are, by
necessity, abstractions, it is to be expected that empirical
observations will in most (or all) cases deviate from predicted results
to some degree. Consequently, a "sophisticated" falsification
methodology must distinguish between those deviations that falsify a
theory and those that do not.
Popper's student, Kuhn, famously argued that the implication of
Popper's theory was that there can be no single scientific method for
testing hypotheses (or in his terminology, for rejecting an existing
scientific paradigm and adopting a new revolutionary paradigm)
because methodology itself is always internal to a paradigm or
hypothesis.^"" That is, a scientist may very well have "good reasons"
like "accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfolness, and the Uke" for
shifting paradigms, but never logically necessary ones.^"'
Falsification, therefore, is only a methodology that can be used in
refining the details of a specific existing hypothesis (paradigm), but
243 See infra text accompanying notes 86-88. PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note
16, at 18 ("But abstraction is of the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be
scientific.").
244 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 165-67.
245 See Kuhn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 261.
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not to reject it as a whole. Kuhn damned the methodology of
falsification with faint praise by labeling it "normal s c i e n c e , t o be
distinguished from "revolutionary science" that rejects hypotheses
(i.e., shifts paradigms).As mentioned above, despite Friedman's
claims that he adopts the methodology of falsification, he agrees with
Kuhn that, when it comes to deciding between hypotheses, "men can
ultimately only fight";^''^ and suggests, like Kuhn, that "relevant
considerations" might include "simphcity" and "fruitfulness."^"®
Lakatos's project was to reformulate Popper's methodology in
hght of Kuhn's powerful critique. Lakatos agreed with both Popper
and Kuhn that scientists do not (and should not) reject a hypothesis
merely because of the observation of apparently inconsistent data.
He
states,
"Contrary
to
naive
falsificationism,
no
experiment... alone can lead to falsification. There is no falsification
before the emergence of a better theory.Rather, the scientist
should first identify the "hard core" or theoretically necessary kernel
of her theory that can form the basis of a "scientific research
program"—Lakatos's more modest term for a Kuhnian paradigm.
The scientist then engages in controlled observation (through
experiments or otherwise) in order to identify empirical data
inconsistent with the hypothesis.
When inconsistencies are observed, the theorist does not
immediately reject the theory. Rather, she tries to develop
"auxiliary" hypotheses that both explain away the apparent anomaly
while remaining consistent with the hard core to serve as a

246 Kuhn discusses his concept of normal science extensively. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23-51 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter KUHN,
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]; Kuhn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 246-47,250.
247 KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 6,92.
248 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 5; see also Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical
Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714,728 (1994).
249 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10.
250 Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in

CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 127, at 91, 119 (citations

omitted).
25t See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 34. In Blaug's words:
[Lakatos divides a scientific research program] into rigid and flexible parts
Lakatos observes ... "all scientific research programmes may be characterized
by their 'hard core', surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses
which has to bear the brunt of tests." The hard core is treated as irrefutable by
"the methodological decision of its protagonists"
The protective belt
contains the flexible parts of [a scientific research program], and it is here that
the hard core is combined with auxiliary assumptions to form the specific
testable theories with which the [scientific research program] earns its scientific
reputation.
Id. (quoting IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
PROGRAMMES (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978)).
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"protective belt" buffering the core.^'^ Most of what Kuhn calls
"normal science" would fall within the development of this
protective belt. Although to my knowledge Lakatos does not use
the term, these auxiliaries are developed through abduction—they
are stories that make what was initially surprising (anomalous
observations) seem a matter of course. Consequently, since
abduction is not proof, the scientist cannot stop when she formulates
her auxiharies. The research program requires that she now try to
falsify her auxiliaries (which are now part of her hypothesis). If this
leads to the observation of new data anomalous with the auxiliaries,
the scientist then develops auxiharies to her auxiliaries and repeats
the process, which could theoretically continue ad infinitum.
One of the most interesting aspects of Lakatos's methodology is
that he seeks to develop a "logical" criteria for shifting paradigms by
identifying how a research program degenerates over time. This
happens when the hard core becomes too encrusted with an
increasingly broad protective belt of ad hoc auxiharies.^^^ In other
words, when a research program starts degenerating, the hard core
of the theory starts explaining less, rather than more, about the
world as the majority of the theory becomes excuses for why the
theory does not work in more and more circumstances.
Surprisingly, however, Lakatos does not suggest that a scientist
should reject a research program merely because it is degenerating.
Rather he maintains that the scientist has no choice but to stick with
her hard core until she is able to formulate an alternative hypothesis
that has "excess empirical content.That is, she must formulate a
new hard core that explains more of the observed empirical data
than the degenerated hard core of the old research program.^"
The classic example is the replacement of the Ptolemaic theory
of the solar system with the Copemican (and the replacement of the
Copemican with the Keplerian). As is well known, the Ptolemaic
252 Lakatos, supra note 250, at 132-38.
253 In Blaug's words, a scientific research project degenerates if it "is characterized by the
endless addition of ad hoc adjustments that merely accommodate whatever new facts become
available
" BLAUG, supra note 18, at 33; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at
169-70.
254 Lakatos, supra note 250, at 118.
255 Critics, such as Kuhn himself and Paul Feyerabend, challenge Lakatos's proposition
that excess empirical content constitutes the single "scientific" test for adopting a
"revolutionary" research program (paradigm) as either a theoretical or empirical matter.
Quine argues that all attempts to formulate a coherent theory of falsification are doomed
since the adoption of auxiliary hypotheses is always to some extent ad hoc. Feyerabend goes a
step further and contends that in practice actual scientific methodology is "anything goes."
See supra note 196. I discuss the development of falsification methodology extensively in
Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 161-71.
As I discuss throughout this Article, it is standard practice for economists to accuse their
critics of ad hocery, while ignoring their own.
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theory postulated that the planets (including the sun and moon) all
moved in perfect circles around the earth. When astronomers
observed that planetary movement deviated from the predictions,
they formulated the auxiliary of epicycles—the planets moved in
perfect circles within perfect circles. When additional anomalies
were observed more and more levels of epicycles were added.
Although the astronomers were able to account for most of the
movement they observed by multiplication of epicycles, this was at
the expense of causing their reseeu-ch program to degenerate. The
hard core (the planets moved in a circular orbit around the sun)
explained less and less of planetary movement. Copernican theory
was adopted because its hard core—^the planets (other than the
Moon) moved in perfect circles around the sun—explained more of
the observed movement of the planets than the hard core of the
Ptolemaic. Soon after this, however, anomalies to the Copernican
hard core were observed that required auxiharies. Consequently,
the Copernican theory started degenerating and was very quickly
replaced with the Keplerian hard core that planets (other than the
Moon) moved in elliptical, rather than circular, orbits around the
sun.
C.

Posner's Methodology in Practice

Although Posner claims to adopt a Friedmanesque
methodology based on validation through prediction, he does not
practice what he preaches.
1. Assumptions v. Predictions
The Friedman-Posner methodology is based on the distinction
between the assumptions underlying a theory and the predictions (or
implications) generated by the assumptions. As discussed above,
some of Friedman's critics have charged that his methodology is
flawed precisely because he adopts the unsophisticated position that
one can easily distinguish between assumptions and predictions and
does not offer precise definitions of his terms. If Friedman's attempt
to distinguish between assumptions and predictions is problematic in
theory, Posner's is so in application. One can argue that Posner
often labels as untestable assumptions of economic theory that are,
in fact, at least partially predictions and should, by his own
methodology, be tested. As Blaug points out, this is a sin frequently
made by Friedman as well.
The basic assumption of economics that Friedman and Posner
discuss is economic rationality—in the marketplace, consumers will
act so as to maximize their utility and producers will act so as to
maximize their profits. Friedman, and Posner, argue that this

2001]

JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY

411

assumption should be maintained regardless of its realism or truth
because it has been shown to be a good predictor of market
behavior.
Nevertheless, for all his talk about prediction, falsification, and
testing, Friedman's argument in favor of the rationality postulate is
notoriously lacking in empirical support. For example, Friedman
claims that the "maximization of returns" hypothesis is supported by
"an important body of evidence" culled from "countless applications
of the hypothesis to specific problems and the repeated failure of its
implications to be contradicted."^'® Blaug rightfully describes this as
"without doubt the most frustrating passage in Friedman's entire
essay because it is unaccompanied by even a single instance of these
'countless applications.'"^'"' Friedman's defense that the "evidence is
extremely hard to document [because] it is scattered"^'® seems half
hearted, at best.
According to Nobelist Gary Becker, however, when economists
speak of the predictive power of the rationality postulate they
usually have in mind the prediction of downward-sloping demand
curves and upward-sloping supply curves.^" Despite years of
theoretical speculation and empirical research trying to identify
meaningful exceptions to these phenomena the observations remains
extremely robust.^®" That is, no economist has convincingly proven
the existence of the phenomenon—"giffen goods," or goods with
such snob appeal that demand actually increases with price—that
would seemingly contradict (and potentially falsify) this prediction.^®^
256 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22.
257 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 101.
258 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22.
259 Becker claims to show "that negatively inclined market demand curves result not so
much from rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a wide class of
irrational behavior as well." GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 156 (1976) [hereinafter BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH]. Becker states: "Not
only utility maximization but also many other decision rules, incorporating a wide variety of
irrational behavior, lead to negatively inclined demand curves because of the effect of a
change in prices on opportunities." Id. at 158 (citation omitted).
260 See id. at 156. Becker rhetorically asks, "How can these extensive criticisms [i.e., of the
rationality postulate] be reconciled with the fact that the main implication of utility
theory—that market demand curves would be negatively inclined—has been consistently
verified empirically and found extremely useful in practical problems?" Id.
261 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 23 (4th ed. 1987). As Stigler
notes:
How can we convince a skeptic that this "law of demand" is really true of all
consumers, all times, all commodities? ... Perhaps as persuasive a proof as is
readily summarized is this: If an economist were to demonstrate its failure in a
particular market at a particular time, he would be assured of immortality,
professionally speaking, and rapid promotion while still alive. Since most
economists would not dislike either reward, we may assume that the total
absence of exceptions is not from lack of trying to find them.
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And yet, Becker suggests, this is not necessarily a justification for
continued reliance on the assumption of economic rationality.
Becker shows that the phenomenon of downward-sloping demand
curves does not require the assumption of economic rationality and
is consistent with any number of other less controversial
assumptions.^®
In a footnote,^® Posner acknowledges Becker's analysis but
seems to miss the point. Posner correctly states that Becker does not
argue that downward-sloping demand curves are inconsistent with
the rationality postulate or that most consumers are not in fact
rational.^® I read Becker's point, however, to be that insofar as
economists like Posner have traditionally tried to defend the
hypothesis that individuals are economically rational (despite
empirical evidence to the contrary), on the grounds that it accurately
predicts downward-sloping demand curves, this defense is weak
because other aspects of neoclassical economic theory can predict
the same result.'® In Becker's words, the observation that markets
act as if they were rational does not require the more controversial
hypothesis that individual market participants are themselves
rational actors.'® That is, the assumption of the rationality postulate
arguably adds nothing to this analysis. Consequently, one cannot
rely on the prediction and observation of downward-sloping demand
curves as a justification for the rationality postulate.'®

Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted). Later Stigler states: "There is some evidenee that this 'Giffen
case'... never existed and none at all that it did." Id. at 57-59.
When I was a young lawyer, I had an acquaintance who worked for a law firm
representing Cuisinart in a federal antitrust enforcement action charging Uleg^ retail pnce
maintenance. The defense that he was assigned to work on was that Cuismart's action was
justified on the grounds that the Cuisinart (which was at that time the only food prc^ssor sold
to the home chef) was a rare giffen good. Unfortunately, I lost track of this acquaintance and
do not know what happened to this argument.
262 See BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 259, at 161 ("Hence the market
would act as if 'it' were rational [i.e., demand curves would be negatively inclined] not only
when households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or otherwise
irrational.").
263 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1556 n.11.
264 See id.
.
, r. •
265 JST make a similar criticism of Posner's interpretation of Becker.
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Theories and Tropes, supra note 14, at 1598-99.
266 See supra note 260.
• t r tu
267 Becker is a neoclassieal economist who does, of course, adopt his own vanant ot tne
rationality postulate, but does not seek to justify it by predicting demand curves. Rather, he
claims that his "new home economics" is a falsifiable theory that can be tested tteough
analysis of a variety of economie phenomena. Despite these claims, as Blaug notes, Becker
commits the usual economist's sin of confusing falsification and verification: that is, he tries to
predict and observe behavior that is eonsistent with his theory, rather than inconsistent. See
BLAUG, supra note 18, at 226; Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
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Friedman himself notoriously violates his principle that a
scientific theory must specify "the circmnstances for which [it]
holds."^®^ As Blaug points out:
[H]aving
introduced
this
important
methodological
clarification, Friedman immediately spoils the point by allowing
the theory of perfect competition to apply to any firm
whatsoever, depending on circumstances: "there is no
inconsistency in regarding the same firm as if it were a perfect
competitor for one problem and a monopolist for another."^®'

This problem is even greater in Posner's analysis than in
traditional economics. He takes the empirically questionable
assumption of economic rationality—which is not needed to explain
the fundamental economic phenomenon of downward-sloping
demand curves and is a poor predictor of other behavior—and
applies it to any number of legal and social problems."" As is well
known, Posner takes this assumption of economic rationality and
uses it to predict a wide variety of behavior, but in doing so, blurs the
lines between assumptions and predictions.
Specifically, the
assumption of economic behavior was originally adopted in order to
explain observed behavior in explicit markets. The next step,
however, is to assert that consumers are economically rational not
only in express markets, but in implicit markets as well. Is this a
prediction, a new assmnption, or an extension of the old
assumption?
Some of Posner's language suggests the former. He concludes
from the hypothesis that people act economically rational in market
contexts, that we should expect them to act economically rational in
other situations."^ This could be read as suggesting that we predict
from the observation of economically rational behavior in markets
that people will act economically rational elsewhere. If this is a
prediction, then by Posner's own methodology he should not accept
this prediction but test it.
If it is not a prediction, but just an extension of the original
assmnption, then he needs to make new predictions to test through
falsification. Posner's claims that he does this ring hollow.

268 FRIEDMAN, IWPRA, note 12, at 19.
269 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 93 (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 36).
270 For example, he states: "The basic assumption of economics... is instrumental
rationality: the individual chooses the means that are most suitable ... to his ends
The
choice of means need not be and often is not conscious
There is... no paradox in
supposing that sexual behavior... may fruitfully be modeled as rational."
POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 5, at 553.
271 See id. ("Since emotion and reason are not necessarily antagonistic, there is also no
paradox in supposing that sexual behavior, despite the intense emotions that precede and
accompany it, may fruitfully be modeled as rational.")
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Abduction v. Induction (Falsification)

As I discuss in Economic Rationality,^''^ JST point out some facts
that seem surprising under the neoclassical rationality postulate—for
example, that people value the seemingly altruistic concept of
fairness, or that people routinely make the sunk-cost fallacy. Posner
then spins a yarn: Once upon a time, about five million years ago,
maybe men lived in groups like such and such, and maybe their goals
were such and such, and maybe it might make sense to do such and
such based on this—^and concludes that if this story that I just made
up were true, then JST's facts would no longer look surprising. He
suggests that "[w]e need only imagine the kind of cognitive
equipment that would be optimal in the prehistoric environment to
which early man adapted
In other words, Posner's methodology is remarkably like the
one adopted by Rudyard Kipling when he wrote his Just So Stories.
Three of these. How the First Letter Was Written, How the Alphabet
Was Made, and The Cat that Walked by Himself, hypothesize about
the origins of two fundamental bases of civilization—written
language and the domestication of animals. In each story he
purports to imagine what life might have been like for the earliest
human families living millions of years ago. The result is delightfully
amusing precisely because Kipling never meant for anyone to take
his fables to be an accurate account of primitive society—his CroMagnons are immediately recognizable as a proper middle-class
Edwardian family who just happens to live in a cave and wear animal
skins.
In contrast, Posner offers his flights of fancy as descriptions of
what our ancestors might actually have been like and offers these
descriptions as an explanation of modem behavior. Despite his
stated commitment to falsification, Posner does not, however, even
suggest that he now has the responsibility of demonstrating how this
fanciful story of his could be falsified. At most, he offers some
speculation as to how it could be verified.
Posner asserts, for example, that he was able to use
evolutionary biology "to predict [more accurately] than behavioral
economics as conceived by JST" such phenomena as "fairness,"
"cognitive quirks," and "weakness of will.""" In fact, Posner does no
such thing. He does not start with the theory of evolutionary
biology, predict certain forms of behavior, and then look for
empirical data that would either falsify or be consistent with his
272 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
273 Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1570.
274 Id. At this stage, Posner does admit that the second two of this triad may not be
predictable by traditional rational choice theory alone. See id.
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predictions. Rather, he takes JST's data (which is surprising under
traditional neoclassical rationality theory) and abducts that it might
be consistent with some of the hypotheses of evolutionary biologieal
theory. Posner's judgment that evolutionary theory has been
successful in other areas may or may not be a "good reason" for
Posner to think that his abduction will prove fruitful. It certainly is
not, however, proof of the hypothesis abducted. Under Posner's
own stated methodology, it is now that Posner needs to make further
predictions of human behavior based on his abductions and engage
in controlled observations (either of future or past behavior—social
science research can be done by historical studies as well as forwardlooking ones) to try to falsify it.
Instead, Posner vaguely refers to the fact that rational choice
theory has been a good predictor in the past. But this is not a
response to JST's assertion that they have made observations that
not only were not predicted by the theory but also seem inconsistent
with it. That is, behavioral eeonomists think that their evidence
indicates precisely that the rationality postulate is a poor predictor of
economic behavior.
3.

Verification v. Falsification

Posner claims to be following the standard scientific
methodology of falsification. In fact, an examination of his
application of his methodology shows that he chooses "the easier
option of verifieationism."^^^ In Blaug's words:
[W]e begin with the available evidence about human behavior
in areas traditionally neglected by economics and then
congratulate ourselves that we have accounted for it by nothing
more than the application of standard economic logic....
Moreover, we hail the economic approach as superior to any
available alternative, but we restrict the scope of comparison to
our own advantage and we never in fact specify the alternative
approaches that we have in mind. Clearly, if these are the rules
of the game, we simply cannot lose.^^®

In other words, Posnerian theory exploits the rhetoric of scientific
methodology without adhering to any of its substantive
requirements.
An excellent illustration of this is in the introductory,
methodological section of Posner's perhaps most controversial book.
Sex and ReasonE'' In this curious work, Posner purports to offer
275 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 226.
276 Id. In this passage, Blaug is speaking of Becker, another economist who claims to adopt
the methodology of falsification yet actually applies that of verification. See id.
277 POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1-12 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND REASON].
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economic explanations for, and make legal policy suggestions
concerning, a wide variety of sexual laws, customs, and practices.
Not surprisingly, as is so often the case, Posner's single-minded
approach just happens to defend the status quo as being almost
inevitable. This is probably the inevitable result of his flawed
methodology.
Before I go further, I must emphasize that I am not opposed to
the proposition that economics can meaningfully add to our
understanding of sexuality. Indeed, I have argued extensively
elsewhere that Posner's intuition that sex and economics are linked
is consistent with psychoanalytic theory, which holds that both are
forms of eroticism."® This theory, however, suggests that Posner is
incorrect in concluding that an analysis of sexuahty can be reduced
to economics.
Rather than sexuality being subsumed into
economics, psychoanalysis suggests that markets are one of the
simplest, most primitive forms of eroticism. This suggests that we
might learn something about erotics by studying markets as its
simple form, but that the entirety of complex forms of erotics such as
sexuahty and love cannot be reduced to the simple model. If, as
economists posit, actual markets are characterized by the
maximization of enjoyment through instrumental ends-means
reasoning, and if economic subjects respond to incentives and
disincentives, then we might also expect to see similar behavior in
the more obvious erotic relationships of sexuahty, as Posner
suggests. However, psychoanalysis also posits that erotic subjects
often engage both in economically "irrational" behavior calculated
either to frustrate enjoyment or bring about pain and as well as in
philosophically rational speculation designed to determine the
proper ends to pursue, rather than the means to a preexisting end.
Consequently, although some erotic behavior may be predictable,
eroticism by its very nature contains moments of spontaneity
inconsistent with Posnerian prediction. I discuss this at greater
length in Economic Rationality.
Posner states, conventionally, that if his economic analysis of
sexuahty is to have scientific vahdity, then it must be able to be
subjected to falsification. Posner, however, misstates what this test
is. He states: "Another [test of a theory] is its power to generate
counterintuitive (hence novel, nontrivial, nonobvious) hypotheses

278 See JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL,
LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Triumph of
Venus: The Erotics of the Market (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
279 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
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that can be tested empirically and that do not flunk the test. A
number of such hypotheses are proposed in this book
Posner is correct that a falsifiable theory is one that generates
predictions of previously unobserved phenomenon. Posner suggests,
however, that after making such predictions, the scientist then goes
out into the world (or into the lab) and seeks to find examples of the
predicted phenomena. This is the easier process of verification—the
search for phenomena that are consistent with one's theory.
Falsification, in contrast, consists of determining what
previously unobserved phenomena, were it to exist, would be
inconsistent with the hypothesis. The scientist must then try to
devise a mode of controlled observation that would enable one to
determine whether inconsistent phenomena exist.
Under
falsification, a hypothesis is never, of course, definitively proved but
always remains both falhble and corrigible. Nevertheless, if after
repeated attempts scientists fail to find inconsistent phenomena,
then we are justified in remaining committed (if only conditionally
so) to the theory as being not falsified. If, on the contrary, an
apparently inconsistent phenomenon is in fact observed, then the
scientist must determine whether his theory is thereby falsified or,
imder the methodology of sophisticated falsification, whether the
hard core of the theory can be protected by the addition of a
protective belt of auxiliaries. Accordingly:
A theory is to be called "empirical" or "falsifiable" if it divides
the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the
following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those
basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules
out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers
of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic statements
which it does not contradict (or which it "permits").^®'

In contrast, when Posner makes predictions, he only identifies the
second class of statements that are consistent with the hypothesis.
But, according to Popper, "[ajbout the 'permitted' basic statements
[a scientific theory] says nothing. In particular, it does not say that
they are true."^®^ In other words, the fact that a theory accurately
predicts certain facts does not prove the theory. Although Posner
claims that his theory is falsifiable, his examples do not demonstrate
that it is. In Popper's words, "a theory is falsifiable if the class of its
potential falsifiers is not empty.
As I shall discuss shortly, the

280 POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 111, at 5-6.
281 POPPER, SQENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 86.
282 Id. (citation omitted).
283

Id.
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class of statements that could potentially falsify Posner's theory of
sex is indeed empty.
It is not enough, as Posner imphes, that a theory be merely
falsifiable. Identifying falsifiability is only the first step in testing a
hypothesis. One must actually try to falsify it. A theory is falsified
"only if we discover a reproducible effect
refutes the theory."^®"
The methodology of falsification is the search for such a refuting
effect, not the search for a confirming one. In a passage that could
have been written with Posner in mind. Popper states:
The fundamental difference between my approach and the
approach for which I long ago introduced the label "inductivist"
is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative
instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted
refutations—^in short, criticism—^while the inductivist lays stress
on 'positive instances," from which he draws "nondemonstrative inferences," and which he hopes will guarantee
the "reliability" of the conclusions of these inferences.^®'

He continues:
In my view, all that can possibly be "positive" in our scientific
knowledge is positive only in so far as certain theories are, at a
certain moment of time, preferred to others in the light of our
critical discussion which consists of attempted refutations,
including empirical tests. Thus even what may be called
"positive" is so only with respect to negative methods.^

Blaug explains the Popperian method thus: "[T]here is an
asjmunetry between verification and falsification. From a strictly
logical point of view, we can never assert that a hypothesis is
necessarily true because it agrees with the facts
In other
words, in verification, one predicts and looks for data consistent with
one's theory. In falsification, one predicts and looks for data
inconsistent with one's theory. In verification, one feels satisfied
when one finds consistent data. In falsification, one is merely
temporarily and contingently encouraged by the failure to find
inconsistent data.
Consequently, Posner is incorrect to argue that his theory is
falsifiable because it is consistent with certain facts that he predicts
exist in the world. On the other hand, Blaug states, "we can deny
the truth of a hypothesis with reference to the facts
[T]here is
no logic of proof but there is logic of disproof."^®®

284 Id.

285 POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 20.
286 Id.

287 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 15.
288

Id.
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I woiild suggest that the implicit reason why Posner applies the
methodology of verification to his analysis of sexuahty (albeit
incorrectly labeled as falsification) is that, in fact, his analysis is ad
hoc and unfalsifiable.^®' Indeed, reading his analysis, I cannot
imagine any sexual behavior that could not be explained through an
abduction based on his starting "assumptions."
In other words, Posner is guilty of the economist's sin of
preaching falsification but practicing, at best, an "innocuous
falsification"^'" designed not to challenge and test economic theory,
but to protect it from attack.
4. AIDS and Birthrates
For example, in Sex and Reason, Posner, writing in 1992,
predicted that the AIDS epidemic should result in a reduction in the
rate of births to unmarried women.®^ This is because a rational costbenefit analysis would both encourage people to be less promiscuous
and encourage people who do choose to have sex to use condoms in
relatively "casual" sexual encounters (i.e., sexual relations with
persons with whom one does not have a long sexual history or
commitment, such as in marriage of other long-term, stable
relationships).^'^
This prediction of less promiscuity and increased use of
condoms is typical of the type of modest contributions economic
analysis can make to our understanding of sexual behavior. But this
contribution is modest precisely because this type of analysis is
hardly new, or unique to economics.^'^ Indeed, sexual traditionalists
have always argued that the harmful potential effects of nonmarital
sexuahty (for example, through the free availabihty of
contraception) should not be ameliorated precisely because they will

289 See Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 823-24. Hovenkamp suggests:
Often... the positivist economist relies on theory rather than observation to
reach her conclusion about the economic effects of the legal rule. For example,
no one has proved by rigorous attempts at falsification that the common law has
tended toward efficiency
Actual attempts at falsification play only a small
part of economic positivism, even in easy cases.
Id.
290 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 111.
291 See POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 277, at 6,115.
292 See id.
293 As Leiter has accurately stated, the few predictions that economics does successfully
make are mundane and banal, at best: "[S]urely we do not need economics—or any
putative social science" to draw such simplistic, common-sense conclusions. Leiter, supra
note 179, at 307 (citation omitted) (referring specifically, in this case, to "Posner's claim
that 'an increase in the severity of punishment will (ceteris paribus) reduce the amount of
crime'")-
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It is the broader prediction that is

^ What if in fact, the rate of nonmarital births increased, rather
than decreased, during the height of the AIDS epidemic? Would
this falsify Posner's economic analysis of sexuahty? Of course not.
One could argue that the fear of AIDS encouraged people,
rationally, to use condoms. Condoms, of course, have two distmct
purposes: protection from disease and contraception. It people
started using condoms for the first purpose (protection from
disease), one might expect people also to use them for the latter
(contraception). Consequently, women who start usmg condoms
might also be expected to stop using other forms of contraception,
such as diaphragms and birth control piUs. Since condoms are not as
reliable a form of birth control as these other two forms, one might
expect the birth rate to go up in this population of women.
And lo and behold, Posner writmg m 1996 and 1999 makes
precisely this alternative prediction that birth rates will f up and
declares it a victory of rational choice theory over behavioral
economics.''^ He does not mention his earlier prediction let alone
explain why the data do not falsify his theory.
In other words, under Posner's analysis, the existence of the
AIDS epidemic is equally consistent with an increase or a decrease
in the nonmarital birth rate. The result depends on conditions that
are beyond the analysis—i.e., the relative number of women who
before the epidemic used no contraception who have been
encouraged to use condoms as compared to the number of women
who before the epidemic were using another more effective form of
contraception who have been encouraged to switch to condoms.
In fact, out-of-wedlock births as a percentage of aU bnths
increased throughout the eighties and early nineties-Ahe height of
concern over the AIDS epidemic-and began decreasmg m the late
nineties—after more successful treatments of AIDS with protease
inhibitors were introduced.^'® No doubt this neither falsifies nor
294 This is not merely a traditional Christian analysis. Japan only
control pill in 1999, and only after protests from femimsts against its earher
Viaera
The long delay in the approval process for oral contraceptives is, no dou ,
ovefdetermined. Nevertheless, as reported in the American press, one stated reason by at
least some part of the Japanese polity was the usual argument that "the pill wodd enc^age
nromiscuitv and reduce reliance on condoms, leading to the spread of AIDS and other
Lxually trLmitted diseases." Sheryl WuDunn, Japan, Never on the Pill, Seems Ready to Try
-P- note 6, at
Richard A. Posner, Sexual Behaviour, Disease, and Fertility Risk, 1 RISK DECISION
e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Birth Rates at New Low as Teen Age Pregnancy Declin^,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,1999, at A26; Fewer Unwed Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,1996, at A22.
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verifies either of Posner's two inconsistent predictions, because these
statistics might just as well be due to wholly different factors, such as
the aging of the population, the healthy economy, and the
availability of several new forms of contraception.
5. Sophisticated Falsification Redux
Even if we accept Posner's claims to be able to distinguish
between his assumptions and predictions, and to be engaging in
falsification rather than verification, Posner is still not following his
methodology. He claims that the "realism," or even the literal truth,
of his assumptions is irrelevant. Nevertheless, when confronted with
evidence that seems inconsistent with his thesis, he, on the one hand,
vigorously defends the truth of his hypothesis and asserts the falsity
of the alternative and, on the other hand, refuses to find his theory to
be falsified. Rather, he engages in a form of ad hoc argument that
can be seen as a muddled and flawed attempt at sophisticated
falsification.
As I have shown in Economic Rationalitywhen confronted
by evidence that seems anomalous to his theory, Posner does not, as
Lakatos requires, formulate auxiliary hypotheses to protect his hard
core while accounting for the anomalies. Nor does Posner purport
to do what Friedman suggests—continue to apply his theory, despite
the fact that the conditions of its application might not be met on the
grounds that people act "as if they were rational. Rather, Posner
does precisely what he claims he should not do. He rejects his
starting assiunptions concerning economic rationality and adopts a
series of new assumptions concerning human behavior. The only
thing that remains the same about Posner's assumptions is that he
continues to label them "rationahty" even as the substance of the
assumptions changes radically!
Indeed, he does not engage in the process of prediction
followed by attempted falsification at all.^'®
Posner repeats
Friedman's claim that the rationality postulate has been shown to be
a good predictor of economic activity and stops with that. There are
several problems with this—in addition to the obvious one that
Posner does not specify what these studies might be.
As I show in Economic Rationality,^'''^ Posner no longer uses, if
in fact he ever did, Friedman's assumption of economic rationality.
In other words, whether or not empirical investigation has shown
that the theory that economic actors act as if they tried to maximize
297 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
298 This charge is frequently made against Friedman as well. A full discussion is beyond the
scope of this Article.
299 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8.
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their utility based on a well-defined set of preferences and perfect
costless information has been a good predictor of market behavior,
this same evidence does not support the theory that economic actors
act "as if they were constituted by a warring set of competing
subselves, each with its own preferences, or "as if" their genes
programmed them in a way that would have been beneficial out in
the African plains five million years ago. Once Posner changes his
theory (by changing his assumptions), Friedman's methodology
requires that Posner make new predictions, which he would then
seek to falsify through controlled observation of previously
unobserved data, not by abduction and anecdote.
Many economists dispute the empirical claim about the
predictive power of the rationahty postulate. This dispute comes in
two forms. The most common is the relatively simple assertion that
whether or not the rationality postulate has been successful in
making certain predictions, it does not accurately predict a wide
variety of other economic activity-^articularly consumer behavior.
Indeed, Blaug questions why so many economists have resisted ^y
critique of the classic rationahty postulate given both the observation
of anomalies and the existence of alternative theories of economic
behavior.^""
Surely Posner must be aware that Simon, probably the foremost
proponent of behavioral economics, began his empirical studies
precisely because he believed that the traditional theory of economic
rationality was an extremely poor predictor of firm behavior.^"^ He
sought to understand how people actuaUy make decisions not merely
to describe them, but also to develop a theory that would more
accurately predict behavior and provide the basis for making
recommendations about human behavior. And, indeed, Simon
offers a theory that combines the concepts of "bounded rationahty"
and "satisficing" as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of full
rationahty and maximization.^"^
Indeed, the entire behavioral economics movement that Posner
damns as untheoretic can be interpreted as showing that the
traditional rationahty postulate indeed fails to predict consumer
300
BLAUG,IMPRA note 18, at 233. Blaug states:
•
We conclude that the classic defense against criticisms of the rationahty
postulate carries less conviction today than it did in the past. But so what? ...
We do not discard a research program simply because it is subject to
"anomalies" unless an alternative research program is available. However, such
alternatives are in fact available
Id.
301

supra text accompanying note 52.
See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 233. Blaug describes Simon's theory as an alternate to the
classical rationality postulate that can be "descrited as a non-fully-rational theory of
individual action under both certainty and uncertainty." Id.
302
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behavior (such as the persistence of the sunk-cost fallacy), and the
attempt either to develop auxiliary hypotheses to explain these
aberrations, or to abduct a new "revolutionary" paradigm of
economic behavior, which would then need to be tested further.
Posner does not study economic theory in order to further our
knowledge of economics. Rather, he purports to be using economic
theory to justify a legal regime consistent with a politically
conservative point of view. This justification depends on Posner s
assertion that legal subjects act as economic actors not only in
explicit markets, but in all (or almost all) human interactions, which
are reinterpreted as shadow or unphcit markets. The assertion that a
vision of "economic rationality" predicts pricing in markets is used to
argue that the same vision of economic rationality will also explain
sexual, political, and other activity and, therefore, the law should be
such and such. The just so story of Posnerian jurisprudence does not
merely try to justify the status quo, as did Kipling's. It aims also to
justify changing the world in accordance with Posner's personal
ideology.
.
•
u ^
Finally, even if Posner were consistent in his assumptions about
economic rationality and if he were also correct that economic
rationality has been shown to be an excellent predictor of a wide
variety of economic behavior, he still would not be a consistent
follower of Friedmaniacal methodology. To repeat: Falsification
theory holds that a theory is never finally proved, but always remains
corrigible and fallible. When he suggests appropriate legal regimes,
Posner engages in explicit and implicit predictions of past and future
legal behavior by legal subjects. A truly scientific methodology
would require Posner and his followers to then make observations in
order to test these predictions. Not only does Posner not do so, he
condemns JST's attempt to do so as being unscientific and
untheoretical.
So that's all right, Best Beloved. Do you see?^"^

303 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 109 (emphasis added).

